sciendo

Administration, vol. 71, no. 2 (2023), pp. 1–25
doi: 10.2478/admin-2023-0009

Quantitatively comparing elite formation over a century: ministers and judges

John Hogan, Sharon Feeney & Brendan K. O'Rourke
Faculty of Business, Technological University Dublin, Ireland

Abstract

This paper employs elite formation quantitative indices to directly and transparently compare the role of the Irish secondary school system in the formation of Ireland's political and judicial elites, over its history as an independent country (1922–2022). Whereas other elite studies have tended to compare either the same elite formation systems or the same elites, across countries, we examine the eliteness, influence and exclusiveness of one formation system in the creation of two very different societal elites. Our results suggest that the secondary schools that educated Ireland's superior court judges were significantly more elite and influential than those that educated its cabinet ministers. Additionally, the vast majority of the secondary schools that educated superior court judges, and about 30 per cent of those that educated cabinet ministers, were fee-paying schools, a category of school that constitutes only a tiny fraction of the secondary schools in the country.

Keywords: Elite, education, ministers, judges, elite formation, judicial careers, political careers

Introduction

This paper focuses on Irish elites and their formation over a century. By elites we mean 'small minorities who appear to play an exception-

ally influential part in political and social affairs' (Parry, 1967, p. 12). As Heilbron et al. (2017, p. 11) note, elites are groups 'on which data is notoriously hard to find' internationally, and particularly in Ireland (Courtois, 2020). Yet, by specifying particular elites (as recommended by Cousin et al., 2018), and by using databases in new ways, this paper provides observational data on elites *in toto* rather than by a sampling approach (as called for by Bukodi & Goldthorpe, 2021). Using indices developed by O'Rourke et al. (2015), we quantitatively examine the influence, exclusiveness and eliteness of the Irish secondary school system in the formation of two elites: cabinet ministers and judges in the superior courts (Supreme, High and Appeals Courts) between 1922 and 2022 – those who have constituted the executive and judicial branches of government.

We focus upon the secondary school system, as secondary school education is important in forming the social connections and world views of its students. A process of socialisation occurs for children to learn their culture and become effective members of their society (Macionis & Gerber, 2011). This process has a central influence on their behaviour, beliefs and actions (Cromdal, 2006). Thus, the networks that graduates develop when in secondary education can influence their lives (Gessaghi & Méndez, 2015). Secondary schools are seen by many scholars, Mills (1956) among them, 'as agents in a conspiracy of the already privileged to perpetuate their privilege forever' (Powell, 1997, p. 85). While universities educate adults, secondary schools educate children deliberately sent to them by their parents (Bond, 2012) and so secondary schools may tell us more about elite reproduction than the arguably more meritocratically composed universities. Ireland's is an educational system divided between 678 free secondary schools and 53 fee-paying institutions that 'largely outperform "free" schools in the national league tables' (Courtois, 2020, p. 169).

We selected 1922 as our starting point, as that year marked Irish independence with the establishment of the Free State, and the creation of cabinet government and the country's independent judicial system (Fanning, 2013). Appointment to cabinet or to the superior courts, in any democracy, places one in a position of rare trust. By definition, few in any society will ever hold such office. Our findings suggest that the secondary schools that educated superior court judges between 1922 and 2022 were significantly more elite and influential than those that educated cabinet ministers, and that these schools were far more likely to be fee-paying schools.

This paper begins with an examination of the literature on elites and their formation in the secondary school system. From there we discuss the development of ministerial and judicial elites in Ireland and the background of the Irish secondary school system. We then explain how we quantitatively measure the secondary school elite formation system using O'Rourke et al.'s (2015) approach. Our data and procedures are then presented. Thereafter, we compare how the elite index (and its constituent measures of influence and exclusiveness) for the Irish secondary school system differs between the education of cabinet ministers and that of senior judges. We finish with a discussion of our results.

Theoretical perspectives on elite formation in secondary schools

There remains a strong connection between social class and the ability to become a member of the elite (Hartmann, 2012; Higley et al., 1996; Lane, 2011). Many previously saw education, and in particular the massification of secondary and tertiary education, as the means to ensure a more meritocratic way of forming elites and to create a fairer society, even if some of those active in broadening educational access were more sceptical (Young, 1958). Alas, scholars have shown that one of the main explanators of elite membership remains social class (Maclean et al., 2017), and that education is not an unadulterated panacea for poverty and inequality. Rather, educational systems are implicated in this elite reproduction and 'contribute to the intra-generational reproduction of the current dominant group' (Borjesson et al., 2016, p. 2). Using his concepts of social and cultural capital, Bourdieu's work made more explicit the mechanisms of how educational institutions can be implicated in 'concealing social selection under the guise of technical selection and legitimating the reproductions of the social hierarchies' (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990, p. 153).

Whereas Bourdieu (1996) stressed the self-validating nature of the grand écoles as key to the French elite, and their reproduction, the role of secondary school systems has been highlighted by other researchers (Courtois, 2018; Hartman, 2012). As secondary schools come earlier in life than universities, it is natural to examine them when looking at the role of social reproduction, rather than individual merit, in the formation of elites. Studies of higher education

institutions, such as grand écoles, tell us a lot about the habitus and the nature of elite networks, and reveal, as studies of elite socialisation at any level, how elites signal their status to others (Lamont et al., 2014). Studies at the university level can also tell us about elite reproduction, but inevitably must deal with the argument that recruitment to higher education involves a greater conflation of meritocratic recruitment and social reproduction. On the other hand, our focus on secondary schools is able to build on empirical studies that use deep description and embedded measurements to examine the importance of secondary schools in elite social reproduction (Courtois, 2018; Kahn, 2011; Sacks, 2007).

Cookson & Persell (2010, p. 27), examining secondary-level boarding schools in the US and UK over twenty-five years, found that these institutions remain a pipeline to selective colleges, continue to socialise students for upper-class membership and retain preparation for power as their core mission. In the US the private preparatory St Paul's School, in New Hampshire, is regarded as one of the primary homes for the adolescent elite. It and other preparatory schools such as Phillips Academy in Massachusetts, with their long lists of alumni who have filled the most senior and prestigious positions in US society, are, through socialisation, providing entry into an exclusive aristocratic culture (Khan, 2012). The British public school system has contributed 'a disproportionate number of its members to the controlling institutions and key decision-making groups of the country' (Domhoff, 1967, p. 5). Reeves et al. (2017) found that of the 54 prime ministers elected to office in the UK, 36 (67 per cent) were educated at one of just 9 elite schools. Since 1955 the UK has had 15 prime ministers, 5 of them educated at Eton, Eton being just one secondary school out of the UK's 4,190 secondary schools. In the UK 'many believe that these [public] schools more than the universities have been the prime institutions through which existing elites have passed on their privileges and symbolic capital' (Williams & Filippakou, 2010, p. 15). It is clear that, as Reeves et al. (2017, p. 1140) put it, 'Elites in the United Kingdom, United States, Australia, Canada, Japan, and France all have strong ties to a small set of private secondary schools'. Courtois (2020) provides an overview of Irish elites – defined as those listed in *Who's Who in Ireland* (Phelan, 2006) – and their relationships with Irish fee-paying secondary schools. Our empirical observations in this paper complement Courtois (2020) by focusing on two specific

elites – the political and judicial elites – answering the call for 'greater analytical specification' in empirical elite studies (Cousin et al., 2018).

The political elite are the power holders of the body politic (Lasswell et al., 1952). They 'possess the flexibility to set the political agenda to which non-elites respond' (Parry, 2005, p. 2). The political elites were, for Marx and Engels (1906, p. 15), 'a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie'. There is little doubt that being a cabinet minister qualifies one as a member of the political elite (Riddell et al., 2011). To be a cabinet minister in a democracy places one in an exclusive club that plays an influential part in society (Marsh et al., 2000). In Ireland the cabinet constitutes the executive branch of government (MacCarthaigh, 2017).

Senior judges occupy a similar position to senior politicians in democracies. Paterson (1974) argues that they could be described as political actors and a political elite. However, unlike politicians, senior judges do not depend upon the electorate for ascension to their elevated positions. Their profession has been described as a closed shop and their appointment to high office in Ireland as a 'closed system' (Mac Cormaic, 2020). This situation is not unique to Ireland, with Ivy League education playing a significant role in, if not an informal requirement for, the selection of state supreme court justices in the US (Emmert & Glick, 1988). The Irish constitution 'gives strikingly impressive powers of judicial review of legislation to the High Court, Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court' (Hogan, 2021, p. 1325). Consequently, the superior courts supervise the Oireachtas (Ireland's legislature) to ensure its laws are constitutional. From the 1960s judicial activism became very important, with judges increasingly regarded as lawmakers (Keane, 2003). The authority of judicial review bestows upon the justices of these courts a concomitant prestige. To sit in the superior courts in Ireland is to be part of an exclusive and highly influential branch of the Irish government.

Elites that are more hereditary than meritocratic lose legitimacy based on rare skills and sufficient links with the rest of the society to make decisions on its behalf (Brezis & Crouzet, 2006). Key to discerning whether particular elites are meritocratic, based on ability and talent, or hereditary, rests in comparisons of how such elites are formed. It is to the role and measurement of the secondary school system in the production of the Irish political and judicial elite that we now turn.

Comparing elite formation: The schooling of cabinet ministers and senior judges

Through comparative studies, we can discover trends and achieve an understanding of broader socio-political characteristics (Blondel, 1995, p. 3). Comparison gives perspective, through either geographical or chronological juxtaposition that facilitates the building of a body of increasingly valuable explanatory theory (Mayer et al., 1993). The elite formation index used here can compare elite formation systems both synchronically (either across comparable elites in different countries or different elites in the same country) and diachronically (for example, to analyse whether or not a formation system is becoming more or less elite across years or decades). Here we focus on comparing the role of the Irish secondary school system (elite formation system) in the formation of cabinet ministers and senior judges.

The year 2022 marked the centenary of Irish independence. The Irish parliamentary system manifests many similarities to the Westminster system in structure and culture (Gallagher, 2009; Lijphart, 1999; MacCarthaigh, 2012). 'In the Westminster model, parliament is not seen as a real maker of law, but instead provides a forum where the issues raised by a government proposal can be fully aired' (Gallagher, 2009, p. 209). Under *Bunreacht na hÉireann* (Irish Constitution) the cabinet, exercising executive authority, is the government (Government of Ireland, 1937). Thus, Ireland has a constitutional, statute and common-law legal system, inherited from the British, like many of their former colonies (MacCarthaigh, 2012). But, unlike the UK, Ireland has a written constitution. The superior courts – the Supreme Court, the High Court and the Court of Appeal – are all provided for in *Bunreacht na hÉireann* (Government of Ireland, 1937). These courts possess the authority to interpret the Constitution.

The historical development of the Irish elites was somewhat similar to that in the UK, given Ireland's absorption into the UK from 1801 until 1922. By the end of the eighteenth century a 'fusing of English, Welsh, Scottish and Irish elites through marriage and inheritance saw a convergence of perspectives and increased the cohesion of the British ruling class' (Moe, 2007, p. 64). Assisting this process was education. By the turn of the nineteenth century most of the elite received their education at what were called 'public schools'. These were schools that were open to anyone who could pass the entrance

examination and afford the fees, without religious or other restrictions, such as Eton, Winchester and Harrow (Colley, 1992, p. 167).

Following Irish independence in 1922, the ascendancy class – the propertied elite associated with the former British regime – became socially marginalised (Collins & Cradden, 2001). Thereafter, the Irish gradually developed their own indigenous elite upon the foundations of a rising mercantile class (Lee, 1989). As the country is small, there is a certain homogeneity that characterises the Irish elite. By the mid 1990s, higher and lower professionals[1] – those citizens with a higher education – were disproportionately represented in the Dáil (Feeney et al., 2017). Higher professionals constituted almost a quarter of teachtaí dála (TDs) (members of parliament), compared with just 4 per cent of society (Constitutional Review Group, 1996). Carroll (2005) found that just after the turn of the century, after eighty years of independence, the judges of the superior courts were most likely to be male, be Dublin born and have attended a private secondary school. In general, judges in Ireland hail from the 'prosperous middle-class' (Gallagher, 2018, p. 74) and are themselves upper-class, drawn 'almost exclusively from a small pool of wealthy former legal practitioners' (Doyle, 2018, p. 188). Secondary school education has been free in Ireland since 1967 (MacCarthaigh, 2008), although there remain 53 'private' fee-paying secondary schools (out of the total of 731 secondary schools), albeit with the state paying the teachers' salaries.

Methodology: The elite formation indices

We will compare the role of the secondary school system in the formation of the members of two of the branches of the Irish government over the century from 1922 to 2022. This period witnessed the formation of thirty-three governments and thirty-three dálaí (lower house of parliament); along with the creation of the superior courts (Supreme, High and Appeals) system.

Relying upon the thick description and the largely qualitative approaches traditionally associated with elite research, not only to

[1] Higher and lower professionals are socio-economic group and occupation categories used by the Central Statistics Office (CSO). Higher professional encompasses occupations such as doctor, solicitor and barrister, while lower professional includes teacher, nurse and midwife. Full details on all of the occupations under these categories can be found in Appendix 5 of the 2002 Census report at:
https://www.cso.ie/en/media/csoie/census/documents/vol10_appendix.pdf

understand the social forces but merely to get a sense of quantities, is problematic due to the multidimensionality of elite formation. Consequently, O'Rourke et al.'s (2015) elite formation indices are used here, as they make this multidimensionality manageable by capturing measures of the influence and exclusivity that combine to index how elite a particular system of institutions is in the formation of a specific societal group – how elite the secondary school system is in relation to the composition of cabinets or superior courts. As the influence and exclusivity of a *system* of institutions are more complex than intuition suggests, we will examine measures of influence and exclusiveness separately, before they are combined into the overarching eliteness index.

Following the use of the indices, we will present some other findings not captured by them.

Measuring the influence, exclusivity and eliteness of the secondary school system that produced the ministers and judges

For O'Rourke et al.'s (2015) Institutional Influence Index (I-Index), the influence of a set of elite formation institutions comprises two dimensions: the number (fewer being associated with greater influence) of institutions that produce members of the elite and the unevenness of the shares (the more uneven, the greater the influence) of the elite among those institutions. The I-Index of a system of institutions is the sum, across the number of institutions (n), of squared shares (s) of affiliates (graduates) of each institution (i) in the elite (cabinet or superior courts), so that:

$$I = \sum_{i=1}^{i=n} \left(\frac{m_i}{M}\right)^2$$

where m_i is the number of affiliates of institute i that are members of the elite in question and M is the total number of members of that elite (O'Rourke et al., 2015).

The influence of the secondary school system on the formation of cabinet members and senior judges depends upon the proportion educated in specific secondary schools along with the limited number of those schools. Thus, the I-Index goes up if a greater proportion of ministers, or judges, are graduates of any one school. The I-Index will also increase if there are fewer secondary schools involved in producing members of these elites. This formula is an adaptation of

the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (H-Index) (Davies et al., 1991, p. 82). Adapting this formula means that I-Index values can also be compared with the many measures of market power that have been carried out using the H-index.

O'Rourke et al. (2015) argue that the exclusivity of a set of elite formation institutions comprises two dimensions. Firstly, the more alternatives there are to any one institution, the more exclusiveness there can be. Secondly, the more unequal the shares of each institution of the relevant general population, the more exclusiveness there is – for example, if the secondary school Gonzaga halved its intake of students, this would result in increased exclusivity, other things being equal. In their XE (exclusivity)-Index, P is the total number in the relevant general population (all students in secondary school), p_k is the population in the k^{th} secondary school, and t is the number of elite-producing secondary schools:

$$XE = \left[\frac{\Sigma_{k=1}^{k=t} 1 - \left(\frac{p_k}{P}\right)^{0.5}}{t} \right]$$

For the relevant P we took the total secondary school population in 2021 from Department of Education data.[2] For p_i we took the number of students attending each elite-producing secondary school in 2021 according to the Department of Education data. Although it would be possible to construct arguments for other measures of relevant general populations and numbers in each school, we chose these as the most straightforward. This data is sampled in the Appendices and displayed in its totality in the linked data sets.[3]

The XE-Index measures the exclusiveness of elite institutions only. It is not affected by how non-elite institutions (secondary schools without graduates in the elite group – cabinet or judiciary) vary in size. The XE-index also measures changes in both the proportion of the relevant population that goes to elite secondary schools and how that proportion is shared out among those institutions.

O'Rourke et al.'s (2015) elite index links influence and exclusivity at the level of each institution, before aggregation to the system. A secondary school may be very influential, in having many affiliates (graduates) in influential positions in a country, but so inclusive that it cannot be claimed to contribute to the eliteness of the system.

[2] https://assets.gov.ie/129346/de6f5f01-b86b-4503-b5a6-c8da4d78dfa7.xlsx
[3] https://arrow.tudublin.ie/adaptdata/1/

Similarly, secondary schools may be exclusive, without being influential, if no affiliates are in the elite. Thus, the Institutional Eliteness Index (E-Index) is the linked combination of influence and exclusivity:

$$E = \sum_{i=1}^{i=n} \left(\frac{m_i}{M}\right)^2 \left(1 - \left(\frac{p_i}{P}\right)^{0.5}\right)$$

The indices produce measures that allow quantitative comparison of elite formation systems of different sizes. Thus, the findings will enable us to see how an elite formation system's eliteness, influence and exclusiveness vary between different elites. Also, as elite formation in Ireland is well understood, our findings can be examined in the context of previous qualitative work (Cohan, 1972; Courtois, 2018; Kennedy & Power, 2010).

Ministerial and judicial data

We focus upon the secondary schools attended by cabinet ministers and senior judiciary between 1922 and 2022 to gain an insight into the eliteness of these institutions. We acquired this data from examining each of the ministers' and judges' CVs, personal webpages where available, LinkedIn, Wikipedia, the *Dictionary of Irish Biography*[4] and various articles concerning them in *The Irish Times* (newspaper of record), as well as in other newspapers such as the *Irish Examiner* and the *Irish Independent*. We also acquired data from the schools' websites and from their Wikipedia pages. All of the data presented, and used here, comes from public domain sources exclusively. This data is presented in sample form in the Appendices and can be found in its totality in the linked data sets.[5]

Between 1922 and 2022, encompassing the Irish Free State (1922–37) and then Ireland (1937–2022), there have been 199 ministers in Irish governments and 191 judges in the superior courts. While it might have been expected that these figures would have been higher, given that we are looking at a century, it tends to be the case that senior politicians, if re-elected, are often reappointed as ministers in various governments, and that judges, once appointed, often remain on the bench until retirement (Mac Cormaic, 2016). For instance,

[4] https://www.dib.ie/

[5] https://arrow.tudublin.ie/adaptdata/1/

Seán Lemass, throughout his 45 years as a TD, over 28 of which were spent in cabinet, held many portfolios, including the office of Taoiseach in 3 different governments and that of Minister for Industry and Commerce in 10! Chief Justice Liam Hamilton spent 26 years on the bench, being appointed to the High Court in 1974, becoming president of that court in 1985, then being appointed to the Supreme Court in 1994 and retiring in 2000 (Mac Cormaic, 2016).

Of the 199 cabinet ministers, at least 11 attended secondary school overseas (primarily in the UK and US), and at least 7 never attended secondary school at all (not that surprising in the early part of the previous century), leaving us with a population of 181 ministers. However, we lack information on the secondary schools attended by 5 of these ministers. Thus, of a relevant population of at most 181 we possess data on the secondary schools attended by 176 ministers.

Of the 191 superior court justices, at least 13 attended secondary schools overseas (UK and US), and one was home-schooled, leaving us with a relevant population of at most 177 judges. However, we lack information on the secondary schools attended by 51 of these judges, leaving us with 126.

Results and analysis

Appendix A shows samples of the calculations, contained in the linked data set, for the E-Index, I-Index and XE-Index for the secondary schools that provided cabinet ministers between 1922 and 2022. Appendix B shows similar calculations for the secondary schools that produced superior court judges, with a link to the comprehensive data set. The indices are directly comparable for the secondary school system producing both elites. Additionally, the index scores for the individual schools producing ministers and judges, some of which appear on both lists (see Appendices A and B and linked data sets), are also directly comparable.

Eliteness (E-Index) scores

In Table 1 we set out the values of the E-Index for the secondary school system supplying ministers and superior court judges in Ireland between 1922 and 2022.

The E-Index for the secondary school system was 0.0136 for cabinet ministers and 0.0477 for superior court judges. Thus, the Irish secondary school system was 3.5 times as elite when producing

Table 1: Elite indices for the secondary school system supplying cabinet ministers and senior judges

	E-Index
Cabinet ministers	0.0136
Superior Court judges	0.0477

superior judges as when producing cabinet ministers. When O'Rourke et al. (2015) examined the eliteness of the UK secondary school system in producing cabinet ministers between 1937 and 2012 they found an E-Index of 0.0253. While higher than our finding for Irish cabinet ministers, it is significantly lower than the E-Index for Irish superior court judges. Our finding here is consistent with some of the qualitative investigations of other researchers (e.g. Courtois, 2018; Kennedy & Power, 2010). For instance, Courtois (2018), examining Phelan's (2006) *Who's Who in Ireland*, found that 21 per cent of the politicians listed (which included some who were, or had been, cabinet ministers) and 61 per cent of the higher professionals listed (which included some superior court judges) had been educated in fee-paying schools.

We now move on to consider the influence and exclusivity components of eliteness in terms of how the secondary school system supplies ministers and judges.

Influence (I-Index) scores

In Table 2 we can see the I-Index values for the secondary school system supplying cabinet ministers and superior court judges between 1922 and 2022.

Table 2: Influence indices for the secondary school system supplying cabinet ministers and senior judges

	I-Index
Cabinet ministers	0.0141
Superior Court judges	0.0497

The I-Index for the secondary schools supplying superior court judges was 3.52 times that for the secondary schools supplying cabinet ministers, which again reflects the impression one gets from a more intimate reading of the situation. To put this in context O'Rourke et al. (2015) measured an I-Index of 0.0257 for the secondary schools

educating UK cabinet ministers between 1937 and 2012, again significantly lower than our finding here for Irish superior court judges. Kennedy & Power's (2010, p. 229) more qualitative study found that in the early 2000s three-quarters of the then sitting Supreme Court judges had been educated in fee-paying schools, as had a 'disproportionate' number of politicians. However, they provide no details as to the ratios of judges and politicians educated in fee-paying schools.

The I-Index scores are effectively measures of supplier (secondary school) concentration in the production of the political and judicial elites. In the industrial economics context, markets with a H-Index of less than 0.2 would be considered competitive. Viewing schools as sellers and cabinets and superior courts as buyers, there is no evidence of monopoly power being held by the secondary schools in supplying ministers or senior judges over the past century.

Of course, concerns about elitist secondary schools supplying cabinet ministers and superior court judges are broader than the traditional industrial economics concern with monopoly power. Firstly, there is the social concern about the lack of diversity in elite formation – an elite that lacks diversity may be more subject to groupthink (Resnik & Smith, 2020). Secondly, there is the representativeness by elites of experiences in the general population – it is unhelpful if a governing, or judging, elite is unfamiliar with the lived experiences of the governed or the judged (Luce, 2017). Thirdly, there is the social concern that the exclusivity of those schools is restricting access to elite positions unfairly (Reeves et al., 2017; Weeden, 2002). The first two concerns mean that we might have issues at lower levels of the I-index than industrial economics would suggest, which is concerning given the figures in Table 2, particularly in relation to the judiciary. The third concern, unfair restriction of opportunity, is more directly addressed in the following section by the other component of our eliteness measure, the exclusivity or XE-Index.

Exclusiveness (XE-Index) scores for cabinet ministers and Superior Court judges

Whereas the I-Index was used to measure the influence of the elite formation institutions, the XE-Index seeks to measure the exclusivity of those institutions. From Table 3, we can see that the XE-Index for cabinet ministers was 0.9633, while the comparable score for superior court judges was 0.9646.

Table 3: Exclusiveness indices for the secondary school system supplying cabinet ministers and senior judges

	XE-Index
Cabinet ministers	0.9633
Superior Court judges	0.9646

The secondary school system was just a little more exclusive in supplying superior court judges than cabinet ministers between 1922 and 2022. What exactly accounts for this very slightly higher exclusivity – be it hereditary, meritocratic or some mixture of the two – is something that warrants future investigation, but is outside the scope of this paper. The XE-Index shows that while the secondary school system is a little less exclusive in producing cabinet ministers than in producing superior court judges, this difference is very minor despite positions in the executive branch being contingent upon regularly held elections.

Other observations

Although there are 731 secondary schools in the country,[6] only 55 supplied superior court judges and 118 supplied cabinet ministers between 1922 and 2022. 74 per cent of the senior judiciary in our data were educated in fee-paying schools; the comparable figure for cabinet ministers was 30 per cent. These percentages far exceed the average for the population at large, as fee-paying institutions account for only 53 (7.25 per cent) of the country's 731 secondary schools,[7] and only 6.8 per cent of all secondary school pupils (McCarthaigh, 2020). Graduates of such fee-paying schools are clearly overrepresented in both of the branches of government examined here.

Of the top 10 secondary schools supplying the superior court judges in our data, which account for 75 (60 per cent) of the 126 superior court appointments we were able to examine (see Appendix B and linked data set), 9 were fee-paying schools. In terms of the executive, the top 10 secondary schools supplying ministers accounted for only 44 (25 per cent) of all appointments over the century (see Appendix A and linked data set), and 5 of these schools were fee-paying. Fee-paying schools, in particular, seem central to the production of the judicial elite (Courtois, 2020), and less so in the case of the executive.

[6] https://assets.gov.ie/129346/de6f5f01-b86b-4503-b5a6-c8da4d78dfa7.xlsx
[7] https://assets.gov.ie/129346/de6f5f01-b86b-4503-b5a6-c8da4d78dfa7.xlsx

From the Appendices we can see that Clongowes Wood, Castleknock College and Blackrock College appeared in the list of the top 10 schools supplying both ministers and superior court judges in our samples, with Clongowes Wood being first for both ministers and judges. However, in terms of the education of cabinet ministers, the O'Connell School, a free secondary school located in north inner city Dublin, is ranked second, educating 7 cabinet ministers over the century, 2 of whom were the Taoisigh John A. Costello and Séan Lemass.

The average Irish secondary school comprises 518 students.[8] The average number of students in the secondary schools attended by the senior judges examined here was 496, while it was 535 for the schools attended by the cabinet ministers. The benefits of smaller schools, and perhaps smaller class sizes on average, include possibly improved student attitudes and behaviours, a sense of belonging, the improved quality of the curriculum and increased student achievement (Taylor, 2009).

Discussion

A concern that often raises its head when elite formation systems are found to be concentrated, especially through a high level of influence in formation institutions, is the danger that the elite will have a greater tendency to suffer from groupthink (Janis, 1983). The mere similarity in the formation experience of an elite may mean that the elite lacks the richness of ideas that greater diversity might bring. When the influence (I-Index) is high, as was the case with judges relative to cabinet ministers, then there is a concern that important decisions may be made with an overly restricted viewpoint (formed by relatively few institutions, in this case secondary schools) – as there will be a lack of diversity amongst those making the decisions (Axelrod, 2015; Power et al., 2013). Though, there is the advantage that judges form a coherent group that can rely on commonality of background to communicate with each other. In the case of the judiciary a commonality of background may help their independence and promote a culture that might mitigate against political fads and fashions. O'Donnell's (2019) work on Ireland's relatively low imprisonment rates may cast more light on this. Whether the Irish judiciary gain enough commonality in background in their legal training, or if their shared secondary

[8] https://assets.gov.ie/129346/de6f5f01-b86b-4503-b5a6-c8da4d78dfa7.xlsx

schooling is positive overall, is an interesting question. Our work in clarifying the existence and extent of the concentration of the superior court judge elite formation system might alert those concerned to the literature on groupthink, polythink, and their management and complications (for example, Mintz & Schneiderman, 2018).

Another concern with concentrated elite formation systems, more associated with the exclusiveness of the system, is that elites may be biased in making their decisions in favour of the groups included and against those excluded. Our research shows that the exclusiveness of the elite formation system was slightly higher for Irish judges than for Irish cabinet ministers, and we know from previous research that these are both lower than the exclusiveness of the elite formation index for British cabinet ministers (O'Rourke et al., 2015). This does not mean that we can rule out such problems, given that the exclusionary nature of the British cabinet formation system is thought to be world-beating. However, on at least one dimension of bias, analysis of Irish Supreme Court decisions does not show any evidence of partisanship, a problem which bedevils the US (Elgie et al., 2018). Neitz (2013) points to the dangers of socio-economic bias in judges, given their elevated socio-economic societal position, which would be embedded further by exclusiveness in a formation system. Sentencing is one area where such a problem might show itself. Dempsey (2016) highlights how little is known about socio-economic bias in sentencing in Ireland, though legal scholars have not neglected the issue (Bacik et al., 1997). Given the extensive role of lower courts in sentencing, our work here can cast little direct light on that issue. However, as more research is published about Irish sentencing, our results may be relevant in understanding superior court guidance on sentencing, as well as understanding the role of socio-economic background in informing superior court judges on judgements with wider socio-economic significance.

Our results show that there was a difference in the particular secondary schools that were most influential in the formation of the judges (for example, Clongowes Wood) and cabinet ministers (Dublin's O'Connell School). This observation tells something about elites in different domains and in their formation – 'how schools cultivate class solidarity across the various elite segments they bring together' (Courtois, 2020, p. 176). However, as we have seen, in the case of the Irish political and judicial elites their formation has not been achieved by attending the same secondary schools. Of course, this negative answer turns us towards the need for other empirical

approaches, quantitative ones, possibly focused on higher education (perhaps using methods like Feeney et al., 2017), and qualitative ones focused on secondary schooling (such as those of Courtois, 2018).

Conclusion

This paper quantitatively examined the role of an elite formation system, the secondary school system, in the creation of societal elites – cabinet ministers and superior court judges, the executive and judicial branches of government – over a century. The influence, exclusiveness and eliteness of the secondary schools attended by the ministers and judges are compared and contrasted. Thus, using the constituent elements that equate to eliteness, we can see how each of the dimensions of eliteness varies between the secondary schools supplying ministers and those supplying judges. This direct quantitative comparability constitutes a major contribution to the literature on elites in Ireland, complementing the more embedded measurements of general elite formation and the thick descriptions of the processes of elite socialisation.

Up to now, while we might have had the general impression that the secondary schools supplying ministers were less elite, influential and exclusive than those supplying the judiciary, this had never previously been quantitatively scrutinised for such clearly specified elite groups, in such a directly comparable fashion, covering such a long period. Consequently, the indices used here bring a level of transparency and facility in comparison to the topic that was previously absent, while at the same time not supplanting the relevance of qualitative contextual analysis where necessary.

The eliteness of the secondary school system was much greater in the case of the judiciary than the executive, with the E-Index for the judiciary being 3.5 times that of cabinet ministers. The concentration of influence in the secondary schools supplying the judges was also far higher, with the I-Index being 3.5 times that for the schools supplying cabinet ministers. The high E- and I-Indices for the secondary schools suppling the superior court judges were also high in an international context when compared to the E- and I-Index scores for the secondary schools suppling cabinet ministers in the UK between 1937 and 2012, as set out by O'Rourke et al. (2015). This provides context for the Irish findings, given that UK public schools are well known for educating significant numbers of British cabinet ministers and prime ministers. Surprisingly, perhaps, given the fact that the average size of the

secondary schools attended by the members of the judiciary was 7 per cent smaller than those attended by cabinet ministers, the XE (exclusivity)-Index for the secondary schools supplying judges was only very slightly higher than that for the schools supplying ministers.

Our research indicates that, over the century between 1922 and 2022, only a small percentage of secondary schools, out of the total number of such institutions in the country, provided cabinet ministers or senior judges. Even fewer secondary schools provided more than one graduate to either the executive or superior judiciary. While private fee-paying secondary schools account for only 6.9 per cent of all secondary schools in the country, three-quarters of senior judges attended such institutions, in comparison to less than a third of cabinet ministers.

As Vercesi (2022) points out, the recent literature on elites has turned its attention to the new political elites and the stability and change in their background characteristics. Ireland and other states formed in the twentieth century provide rich cases in which this could be explored – examining the degree to which the creation of a new state influenced the elite formation system might benefit from the approach used here. Clearly, those occupying cabinet positions in the newly independent Irish state in the 1920s were different from the previous elite, but many have argued that there was a continuance in ideology and key personnel (O'Rourke & Hogan, 2017). Daly (1994) points to how, although there was continuity in the Irish civil service, the British practice of recruiting the upper echelons from particular universities was replaced by more internal promotion, resulting not only in a gradual change in elite civil servants but in a distancing of the Irish civil servants from Irish universities. The relevance of such questions continues as the subtleties of social reproduction are revealed, often as unintended side-effects of other policies (Kester, 2017).

References

Axelrod, R. (2015). *Structure of decision: The cognitive maps of political elites*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

Bacik, I., Kelly, A., O'Connell, M., & Sinclair, H. (1997). Crime and poverty in Dublin: An analysis of the association between community deprivation, District Court appearance and sentence severity. *Irish Criminal Law Journal*, *7* (2), 104–33.

Blondel, J. (1995). *Comparative government: An introduction* (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Bond, M. (2012). The bases of elite social behaviour: Patterns of club affiliation among members of the House of Lords. *Sociology*, *46* (4), 613–32.

Borjesson, M., Broady, D., Dalberg, T., & Lindegran, I. (2016). Elite education in Sweden. In C. Maxwell and P. Aggleton (Eds), *Elite education: International perspectives* (pp. 92–103). Abingdon: Routledge.

Bourdieu, P. (1996). *The state nobility: Elite schools in the field of power* (L.C. Clough, Trans.). Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bourdieu, P., & Passeron, J.-C. (1990). *Reproduction in education, society and culture*. London: Sage Publications.

Brezis, E. S., & Crouzet, F. (2006). The role of higher education institutions: Recruitment of elites and economic growth. In T. S. Eicher & C. García-Penalosa (Eds), *Institutions, development, and economic growth*. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Bukodi, E., & Goldthorpe, J. H. (2021). Elite studies: For a new approach. *The Political Quarterly*, *92* (4), 673–81. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.13072

Carroll, J. (2005). You be the judge, part I. *Bar Review*, *10* (5), 153.

Cohan, A. S. (1972). *The Irish political elite*. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan.

Colley, L. (1992). *Britons: Forging the nation*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Collins, N., & Cradden, T. (2001). *Irish politics today*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Constitutional Review Group. (1996). *Report of the Constitutional Review Group*. Dublin: The Stationery Office.

Cookson, P. W., Jr., & Persell, C. H. (2010). Preparing for power: Twenty-five years later. In A. Howard & R. A. Gaztambide-Fernandez (Eds), *Educating elite: Class privilege and educational advantage* (pp. 13–30). Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield.

Courtois, A. (2018). *Elite schooling and social inequality: Power and privilege in Ireland's top private schools*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Courtois, A. (2020). How can we identify elite schools (where they do not exist)? The case of Ireland. In F. Denord, M. Palme & B. Réau (Eds), *Researching elites and power* (pp. 169–78). London: Springer.

Cousin, B., Khan, S., & Mears, A. (2018). Theoretical and methodological pathways for research on elites. *Socio-Economic Review*, *16* (2), 225–49. https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwy019

Cromdal, J. (2006). Socialization. In K. Brown (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of language and linguistics* (pp. 462–6). Oxford: Elsevier.

Daly, M. E. (1994). The formation of an Irish nationalist elite? Recruitment to the Irish civil service in the decades prior to independence, 1870–1920. *Paedagogica Historica, 30* (1), 281–301.

Davies, S., Lyons, B., Dixon, H., & Geroski, P. (1991). *Economics of industrial organisation*. London: Longman.

Dempsey, L. (2016). The greater of two evils – examining sentencing variations in the Irish Courts: A critical and methodological appraisal. *University College Dublin Law Review*, *16*, 164–206.

Domhoff, G. W. (1967). *Who rules America?* Engelwood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Doyle, O. (2018). *The Constitution of Ireland: A contextual analysis*. Oxford: Hart Publishing.

Elgie, R., McAuley, A., & O'Malley, E. (2018). The (not-so-surprising) non-partisanship of the Irish Supreme Court. *Irish Political Studies*, *33* (1), 88–111. https://doi.org/10.1080/07907184.2017.1318851

Emmert, C. F., & Glick, H. R. (1988). The selection of state supreme court justices. *American Politics Quarterly*, *16* (4), 445–65.

Fanning, R. (2013). *Fatal path: British government and Irish revolution 1910–1922.* London: Faber & Faber.

Feeney, S., Hogan, J., & O'Rourke, B. K. (2017). Elite formation in the higher education systems of Ireland and the UK: Measuring, comparing and decomposing longitudinal patterns of cabinet members. *British Educational Research Journal, 43* (4), 720–42.

Gallagher, M. (2009). The Oireachtas: President and parliament. In J. Coakley & M. Gallagher (Eds), *Politics in the Republic of Ireland* (5th ed.; pp. 198–230). London: Routledge and the PSAI Press.

Gallagher, M. (2018). Politics, the constitution and the judiciary. In J. Coakley & M. Gallagher (Eds), *Politics in the Republic of Ireland* (6th ed.; pp. 57–86). London: Routledge and the PSAI Press.

Gessaghi, V., & Méndez, A. (2015). Elite schools in Buenos Aires: The role of tradition and school social networks in the production and reproduction of privilege. In A. van Zanten & S. J. Ball, with B. Darchy-Koechlin (Eds), *World yearbook of education 2015: Elites, privilege and excellence* (pp. 43–56). New York, NY: Routledge.

Government of Ireland. (1937). *Bunreacht na hÉireann.* Dublin: Oifig an tSoláthair.

Hartmann, M. (2012). *The sociology of elites.* London: Routledge.

Heilbron, J., Bühlmann, F., Hjellbrekke, J., Korsnes, O., & Savage, M. (2017). Introduction. In O. Korsnes, J. Heilbron, J. Hjellbrekke, F. Bühlmann & M. Savage (Eds), *New directions in elite studies* (pp. 43–56) New York, NY: Routledge.

Higley, J., Kullberg, J., & Pakulski, J. (1996). The persistence of post-communist elites. *Journal of Democracy, 7* (2), 133–47. doi: 10.1353/jod.1996.0027

Hogan, G. (2021). Ireland: The Constitution of Ireland and EU law: The complex constitutional debates of a small country. In A. Albi & S. Bardutzky (Eds), *National constitutions in European and global governance: Democracy, rights, the rule of law* (pp. 1323–72). Berlin: Asser Press.

Janis, I. L. (1983). *Groupthink: Psychological studies of policy decisions and fiascoes*. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.

Keane, R. (2003). *Judges as lawmakers: The Irish experience*. Address to the National University of Ireland, Galway, Law Society, 1 October.

Kennedy, M., & Power, M. J. (2010). 'The smokescreen of meritocracy': Elite education in Ireland and the reproduction of class privilege. *Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies*, *8* (2), 223–48.

Kester, K. (2017). On peace capital: The case of academic cultural capital inside the United Nations and its universities. *Asian International Studies Review*, *18* (1), 51–75. https://doi.org/10.1163/2667078X-01801003

Khan, S. R. (2011). *Privilege: The making of an adolescent elite at St. Paul's School*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Khan, S. R. (2012). The sociology of elites. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *38* (1), 361–77.

Lamont, M., Beljean, S., & Clair, M. (2014). What is missing? Cultural processes and causal pathways to inequality. *Socio-Economic Review*, *12* (3), 573–608.

Lane, D. (2011). *Elites and classes in the transformation of state socialism.* New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Lasswell, H. D., Learner, D., & Rothwell, C. E. (1952). *The comparative study of elites: An introduction and bibliography*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Lee, J. J. (1989). *Ireland, 1912–1985: Politics and society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lijphart, A. (1999). *Patterns of democracy: Government forms and performance in thirty-six countries*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Luce, E. (2017). *The retreat of western liberalism*. London: Little Brown.

MacCarthaigh, M. (2008). *Government in modern Ireland*. Dublin: Institute of Public Administration.

MacCarthaigh, M. (2012). Mapping and understanding organizational change: Ireland 1922–2010. *International Journal of Public Administration*, *35* (12), 795–807.

MacCarthaigh, M. (2017). *Public sector reform in Ireland: Countering crisis*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Mac Cormaic, R. (2016). *The Supreme Court*. Dublin: Penguin Ireland.

Mac Cormaic, R. (2020, 20 November). How Ireland's judges are made: A glimpse inside a closed system. *The Irish Times*. https://www.irishtimes.com

Macionis, J. J., & Gerber, L. M. (2011). *Sociology*. Toronto: Pearson Canada.

Maclean, M., Harvey, C., & Kling, G. (2017). Elite business networks and the field of power: A matter of class? *Theory, Culture & Society*, *34* (5–6), 127–51. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276417715071

Marsh, D., Richards, D., & Smith, M. J. (2000). Re-assessing the role of departmental cabinet ministers. *Public Administration*, *78* (2), 305–26.

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1906). *The Communist manifesto* (F. Engels, Trans.). Chicago, IL: Charles H. Kerr and Company.

Mayer, L. C., Burnett, J. H., & Ogden, S. (1993). *Comparative politics: Nations and theories in a changing world*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

McCarthaigh, S. (2020, August 19). Number of students attending fee-paying secondary schools hits highest level in a decade. *Irish Examiner*. https://www.irishexaminer.com

Mills, C. W. (1956). *The power elite*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Mintz, A., & Schneiderman, I. (2018). From groupthink to polythink in the Yom Kippur War decisions of 1973. *ERIS – European Review of International Studies*, *5* (1), 48–66. https://doi.org/10.3224/eris.v5i1.03

Moe, E. (2007). *Governance, growth and global leadership: The role of the state in technological progress, 1750–2000*. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.

Neitz, M. B. (2013). Socioeconomic bias in the judiciary. *Cleveland State Law Review*, *61* (1), 137–66.

O'Donnell, I. (2019). Penal culture in Ireland. In D. M. Farrell & N. Hardiman (Eds), *The Oxford handbook of Irish politics* (pp. 245–63). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

O'Rourke, B. K., & Hogan, J. (2017). Frugal comfort from Ireland: Marginal tales from an austere isle. In S. McBride & B. M. Evans (Eds), *The austerity state* (pp. 144–68). Toronto: University of Toronto.

O'Rourke, B. K., Hogan, J., & Donnelly, P. F. (2015). Developing an elite formation index for comparative elite studies: The case of the schooling of Irish and UK cabinet ministers. *Politics, 35* (1), 3–18. doi: 10.1111/1467-9256.12071

Parry, G. (1967). *Political elites*. London: Allen & Unwin.

Parry, G. (2005). *Political elites* (2nd ed.). Colchester: ECPR Press.

Paterson, A. A. (1974). A political élite? *British Journal of Law and Society*, *1* (2), 118–35.

Phelan, A. (2006). *Who's who in Ireland: The influential Irish* (new ed.). Dublin: Madison Publications Limited.

Powell, A. G. (1997). *Lessons from privilege: The American prep school tradition*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Power, M., O'Flynn, M., Courtois, A., & Kennedy, M. (2013). Neoliberal capitalism and education in Ireland. In D. Hill (Ed.), *Immiseration capitalism, activism and education: Resistance, revolt and revenge* (pp. 41–59). Brighton: Institute for Education Policy Studies.

Reeves, A., Friedman, S., Rahal, C., & Flemmen, M. (2017). The decline and persistence of the old boy: Private schools and elite recruitment 1897 to 2016. *American Sociological Review, 82* (6), 1139–67.

Resnik, D. B., & Smith, E. (2020). Bias and groupthink in sciences peer review system. In D. M. Allen & J. W. Howel (Eds), *Groupthink in science: Greed, pathological altruism, ideology, competition and culture* (pp. 99–114). New York, NY: Springer.

Riddell, P., Gruhn, Z., & Carolan, L. (2011). *The challenge of being a minister: Defining and developing ministerial effectiveness.* London: Institute for Government.

Sacks, P. (2007). *Tearing down the gates: Confronting the class divide in American education*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Taylor, A. (2009). *Linking architecture and education: Sustainable design for learning environments.* Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press.

Vercesi, M. (2022). Are all politicians the same? Reproduction and change of chief executive career patterns in democratic regimes. *International Social Science Journal*, *72* (245), 577–95. https://doi.org/10.1111/issj.12363

Weeden, K. A. (2002). Why do some occupations pay more than others? Social closure and earnings inequality in the United States. *American Journal of Sociology*, *108* (1), 55–101.

Williams, G., & Filippakou, O. (2010). Higher education and UK elite formation in the twentieth century. *Higher Education*, *59* (1), 1–20.

Young, M. D. (1958). *The rise of the meritocracy*. Harmonsworth: Penguin Books.

Appendix A: Secondary schools supplying cabinet ministers, 1922–2022

Indices			*Influence*				*Exclusiveness*	*Eliteness*
Formula			$I = \sum_{i=1}^{i=n} \left(\frac{m_i}{M}\right)^2$			$XE = \left[\frac{\Sigma_{k=1}^{k=t} 1 - \left(\frac{p_k}{P}\right)^{0.5}}{t}\right]$	$E = \sum_{i=1}^{i=n} \left(\frac{m_i}{M}\right)^2 \left(1 - \left(\frac{p_i}{P}\right)^{0.5}\right)$	
Indices results			0.014139979				0.963311405	0.013646103
Totals				118			113.6707458	
School Name	m_i	*pk*	$(m_i/M)^2$	*(t)**	*Pk/P*	√(*Pk/P*)	1 − √(*Pk/P*)	$(m_i/M)^2$ (1 − [√(*Pk/P*)])
Clongowes Wood College, Clane	11	421	0.00390625	1	0.001110279	0.033320848	0.966679152	0.00377609
O'Connell School	7	174	0.00158187	1	0.00045888	0.021421487	0.978578513	0.001547984
St Flannan's College, Ennis	4	1163	0.000516529	1	0.003067113	0.055381518	0.944618482	0.000487923
Synge Street CBS	4	259	0.000516529	1	0.000683046	0.026135143	0.973864857	0.000503029
CBS Wexford	3	683	0.000290548	1	0.001801236	0.042440975	0.957559025	0.000278216
Castleknock College	3	705	0.000290548	1	0.001859256	0.043119087	0.956880913	0.000278019
St Gerald's College, Castlebar	3	619	0.000290548	1	0.001632453	0.040403624	0.959596376	0.000278808
Cistercian College, Roscrea, Tipperary	3	220	0.000290548	1	0.000580193	0.024087201	0.975912799	0.000283549
Presentation Brothers' College (PBC Cork)	3	717	0.000290548	1	0.001890903	0.04348451	0.95651549	0.000277913

Source of pupil numbers: https://assets.gov.ie/129346/de6f5f01-b86b-4503-b5a6-c8da4d78dfa7.xlsx

Notes: All notation explained in main text of paper.
There were 199 cabinet ministers between 1922 and 2022. Of these, 11 were educated overseas, 7 did not attend a secondary school, and for 5 we could find no data as to their schooling.
Total population (P) = 379,184.
Total number of cabinet ministers for which we have data (M) = 176.
* (t) = No. of elite institutions.
Link to full online data set: https://arrow.tudublin.ie/adaptdata/1/

Appendix B: Secondary schools supplying superior court judges, 1922–2022

Indices			*Influence*				*Exclusiveness*	*Eliteness*
Formula			$I = \sum_{i=1}^{i=n} \left(\frac{m_i}{M}\right)^2$			$XE = \left[\frac{\Sigma_{k=1}^{k=t} 1 - \left(\frac{p_k}{P}\right)^{0.5}}{t}\right]$	$E = \sum_{i=1}^{i=n} \left(\frac{m_i}{M}\right)^2 \left(1 - \left(\frac{p_i}{P}\right)^{0.5}\right)$	
Indices results			0.049760645				0.964564504	0.047688004
Totals				55			53.05104773	
School Name	m_i	pk	$(m_i/M)^2$	(t)*	Pk/P	$\sqrt{(Pk/P)}$	$1 - \sqrt{(Pk/P)}$	$(m_i/M)^2 (1 - [\sqrt{(Pk/P)}])$
Clongowes Wood College	16	421	0.016124969	1	0.001474218	0.038395551	0.961604449	0.015505841
Belvedere College	13	1000	0.010644999	1	0.002637242	0.051354085	0.948645915	0.010098335
Blackrock College	9	1023	0.005102041	1	0.002697899	0.0519413	0.9480587	0.004837034
Gonzaga College	8	559	0.004031242	1	0.001474218	0.038395551	0.961604449	0.00387646
St Mary's College, Rathmines, Dublin	7	462	0.00308642	1	0.001218406	0.034905671	0.965094329	0.002978686
Castleknock College	6	705	0.002267574	1	0.001859256	0.043119087	0.956880913	0.002169798
Glenstal Abbey School	6	212	0.002267574	1	0.000559095	0.023645197	0.976354803	0.002213956
Rockwell College	4	506	0.001007811	1	0.001334444	0.036530049	0.963469951	0.000970995
Terenure College	4	720	0.001007811	1	0.001898814	0.043575386	0.956424614	0.000963895

Source of pupil numbers: https://assets.gov.ie/129346/de6f5f01-b86b-4503-b5a6-c8da4d78dfa7.xlsx

Notes: Notation explained in main body of paper.

There were 191 superior courts justices between 1922 and 2022. Of these, at least 13 were educated overseas and one was home-schooled, leaving us with 177 judges who were educated in the Irish secondary shool system.

Total relevant population (P) = 379,184.

Total number of senior judges for which we have data (M) = 126.

* (t) = No. of elite institutions.

Link to full online data set: https://arrow.tudublin.ie/adaptdata/1/