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# STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF WAR MIGRATION OF THE POPULATION ON THE UKRAINIAN AND EUROPEAN LABOUR MARKET

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#### Abstract

**Research background:** The Russian-Ukrainian war has become a significant factor that has prompted millions of Ukrainian citizens to migrate in search of safety. The demographic situation in Ukraine is deteriorating in both quantitative and qualitative dimensions. The mentioned changes are impacting the domestic and European labour markets.

**Purpose:** The article examines the consequences of war migration of the population for domestic and European labour markets.

**Research methodology:** The study covers the period between 2013 and 2023. Empirical research methods were use in the article: observation, comparison, generalization, forecasting.

Results: Ukrainian migrants presently comprise approximately 1% of the population in European Union countries and represent 15% of Ukraine's overall demographic composition. The prevailing inclination among the majority of these migrants is not to return to Ukraine in the immediate future, with the principal determinant being identified as the prevailing sense of peril. Notably, within the age structure of Ukrainian migrants, a significant 81.2% fall within the economically productive age bracket of 18-49 years. This demographic composition sets the stage for a positive economic effect within the European Union, while concurrently engendering adverse repercussions for the domestic labour market in Ukraine. Novelty: A three-year projection regarding the migration volumes of Ukrainians to the European Union has been delineated. Drawing upon post-war reconstruction experiences worldwide and taking into account the critical demographic landscape in Ukraine, a proposition has been put forth to synergize efforts among the government, international organizations, and donors. This collaborative endeavour seeks to establish a financial fund, wherein resources will be allocated towards the formulation of recommendations and the subsequent design and implementation of programs aimed at the restoration of the domestic labour market.

**Keywords:** migration, labour market, survey, repatriation, post-war recovery plan

JEL classification: E24, J60, J61

#### Introduction

In the context of the globalization of production, national markets are losing their isolation and segregation, and transnational labour flows are emerging between them systematically. One of the main elements of the global economic system is the international labour market with its unified scale of criteria for the quality of labour resources, the development of new forms of employment, flexibility, and extreme mobility.

The labour movement between countries and the flows of significant funds caused by it through wages make significant adjustments to the formation of the economic situation in individual countries. The immediate drivers of cyclical fluctuations are often wage transfers from one country to another. At the same time, labour migration affects (worsens or improves)

the living conditions of workers in labour-exporting and importing countries (Roland, 2023). Until recently, the main reasons for migration processes in Ukraine were the uneven distribution of the labour force across the countries of the world, pay gaps, and differences in working conditions.

The full-scale Russian armed aggression has become a significant factor inducing the migration of millions of Ukrainian citizens in search of security. Thus, the demographic situation in Ukraine during 2022–2023 rapidly changed quantitatively and qualitatively. These changes negatively impact the domestic labour market and, accordingly, the socio-economic sphere.

#### 1. Literature review

Migration problems and issues of restoring the potential of the domestic labour market were dealt with by such scientists as Burov (2018), Libanova (2019), Malinovskaya (2018), Petrushyna, Sokolovskyi (2018) and others. At the same time, nowadays, in addition to the problems under investigation, the emotional state of Ukrainians who migrated and their desire to return home requires scientific reflection. Studying these issues will help recommend measures to return Ukrainian citizens, solve unemployment problems, and recover the domestic labour market.

We support the opinion of the scholars from the Razumkov Centre that the war in Ukraine has introduced a novel dimension to the migration policy challenges confronting the European Union (Pyschuk *et al.*, 2023). Simultaneously, their prepared information-analytical report titled "The Impact of Migration Processes on Post-War Recovery of Ukraine and the Migration Policy of the EU and EAP Countries" draws attention to the issue of national, particularly economic security. It accentuates the question of "who will rebuild the country after the war." The report aptly highlights that a pivotal element in this restorative process is a resilient and industrious population, actively engaged in labour, tax contributions, and reinvestment within the nation. Consequently, the primary challenge, as perceived by scholars, currently faced by Ukraine is the volume of forced migrants to EU countries and the development of measures for their eventual repatriation.

A December 2022 report by the National Bank of Ukraine examines the impact of Ukrainian migration on recipient countries' economies (Tucha *et al.*, 2022). While the report highlights the initial challenges on EU financial systems, particularly for neighbouring countries and the Baltic states due to the high volume of migrants, it also acknowledges the long-

term positive effects. Scholars emphasize the positive fiscal impact on Europe as Ukrainians integrate into the labour market. Additionally, spending by Ukrainian migrants abroad boosts private consumption in host countries, further contributing to economic growth.

The analytical report by the National Institute for Strategic Studies (Kyiv) examines the likelihood of migrants' returning to Ukraine and the impact of migration on the country's socioeconomic situation (Potapenko *et al.*, 2023). The structure of the developed recommendations encompasses proposals for the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, ministries, regional military administrations, and local self-government bodies. However, these proposals solely pertain to the protection and support of internally displaced persons (IDPs), lacking provisions for facilitating the repatriation of Ukrainians back home.

Yadlovska (2022), in her characterization of the stages of "war-induced" migration, delineates distinct phases in the migratory patterns. Notably, the migration peak transpired at the end of February and persisted throughout March, followed by a second wave towards the end of the summer, and a subsequent "pre-winter" wave from mid-autumn. Additionally, a projected migration surge is anticipated in the early spring of 2023, attributed to the looming threat of a Russian invasion and the prolonged state of conflict. In her article, the scholar emphasizes the negative consequences of migration for the Ukrainian labour market and points out that its volumes reflect the most significant reduction in the number of Ukrainians residing within the country since the declaration of independence.

This paper's research examples demonstrate the contemporary importance of the identified issue. The findings and recommendations hold both scientific and practical value for revitalizing the Ukrainian labour market and addressing imbalances in the European job market during conflicts and the post-war period.

## 1.1. The aim of the article

Taking into account the goal of Ukraine shortly to become a full member of the European Union, as well as the fact that since February 24, 2022, about 8.1 million Ukrainians have migrated to EU countries, of which 5 million have registered for temporary protection, it would be appropriate to conduct a study of the consequences of war migration of the population for the domestic and European labour markets.

## 2. Research methodology

Given Ukraine's pursuit of European Union membership and the significant war-induced migration to EU countries (approximately 8.1 million Ukrainians, with 5 million seeking temporary protection since February 24, 2022), investigating the impact of this migration on both the Ukrainian and European labour markets is crucial. To address this, we propose employing a robust and established mathematical econometric analysis. Among the various forecasting techniques, extrapolation methods stand out as being particularly prevalent and sophisticated. These methodologies are adept at projecting quantitative parameters for extensive systems, including economic, scientific, and production potential, as well as data pertinent to the advancement of scientific and technological domains. It is noteworthy, however, that the reliability of such forecasts and the confidence therein hinge significantly on the judicious selection of extrapolation boundaries and the consistency of "indicators" concerning the intrinsic nature of the phenomena under consideration.

Extrapolative forecasts prioritize identifying emerging trends and their inherent shifts, rather than predicting specific values of the investigated parameter in the future.

The predictive values of migration indicators can be obtained through the use of a relationship known as the trend equation:

$$y = f(t) + \varepsilon_t \tag{1}$$

where f(t) represents the deterministic component of the process (in our case, the changes in the number of residence permits obtained by Ukrainians over time, denoted as t), and  $\varepsilon_t$  stands for the stochastic component of the process.

The mentioned dependency comprises two elements: a deterministic component driven by known and accounted-for factors and a stochastic component arising from random and unaccounted-for factors.

The component f(t) is modelled through a series of dependencies, encompassing linear, quadratic, power-law, exponential, and hyperbolic functions. This formulation is based on the historical observations captured in the temporal statistical series. The specific form of the relationship is selected in alignment with the characteristics of changes in indicator values over this historical period.

The random component  $\varepsilon$ , necessary for refining (adjusting) forecasted values, is essential. To obtain the predicted indicator values for the forecast period (2013–2023), we substitute the corresponding future year (n + 1, n + 2, ..., n + m) into the trend equation. Here, "m" represents

the number of years being forecasted, which in this case is 10 (m = 10). Microsoft Excel will be used to perform these calculations.

We believe that officially obtained permits for employment and residence by citizens are significant factors for their assimilation into society and potentially serve as an incentive deterring them from returning home. Consequently, the outcomes of this forecast will determine the implications of "war-induced" migration for the Ukrainian and European labour markets.

In addition, we will analyse the results of surveys conducted by the Statistical Office of the European Union (Eurostat) among Ukrainian citizens who were compelled to migrate from the country during the war. Of particular interest are their emotional state and thoughts regarding their potential return in the future.

#### 3. Results

Scientists studying the structure of the international labour market distinguish two segments. The first covers a labour force characterized by permanent employment, stable work skills, high qualifications and salaries, and a relatively clear hierarchy of qualifications (Osman *et al.*, 2022). The second rather large segment of the international labour market is workers from countries with relatively low economic development, among which there is a segment of the illegal labour force.

Until recently, labour migration from Ukraine was represented by most workers in the second segment, whose number increased yearly. Labour migration gained popularity after signing a visa-free regime with the European Union in May 2017 (Figure 1) (European Commission, 2023).




Figure 1. The number of citizens of Ukraine with the status of a long-term migrant in the 27 EU countries, in thousands

Source: European Commission. 2023.

The data in Figure 1 indicate that the number of Ukrainian citizens who had the status of long-term migrants in the EU is growing dynamically. A decrease in the number of Ukrainian migrants in the EU can be traced to 2018–2020, associated with the lockdowns caused by the COVID-19 epidemic. Foreigners left Ukraine en masse, while Ukrainians actively returned to their homeland. The entry of Ukrainian citizens prevailed in the number of exits in March 2020 by 300.8 thousand, in April by 100 thousand, and in May by 53 thousand. However, in June-July, the number of exits exceeded the entries by 156 thousand. According to the year's results, there was an insignificant positive balance of entry/exit of Ukrainian citizens (80 thousand), while in previous years, it was negative.

The data of sociological monitoring conducted annually by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine confirm the progressive dynamics of migration to the EU. In 2018, 7.6% of respondents used the possibility of visa-free travel, whereas in 2019, 14.4%. Most of these were travel (14.4%) and visiting relatives and friends (9.5%), while 8.2% were looking for job opportunities while traveling (Prybytkova, 2019). The number of Ukrainian citizens who received a residence permit in the European Union was also constantly growing (Figure 2) (Eurostat Statistics Explained, 2023).

Between 2013 and 2021, there was a clear upward trend in the total number of residence permits held by Ukrainians in the EU and those holding permits for more than 12 months (Figure 2).




Figure 2. Dynamics of the number of valid residence permits for Ukrainians in the EU, in thousands

Source: Eurostat Statistics Explained. 2023.

The overall growth rate for the said period was 85.7% for all residence permits and 77% for those over 12 months. In absolute terms, this figure has grown over eight years by 724,000 residence permits for persons with Ukrainian citizenship in the EU and 512,000 residence permits for at least 12 months.

According to the International Organization for Migration (Migration Data Portal, 2023), at the end of 2021, 1.57 million citizens of Ukraine had a residence permit in one of the EU countries. Of these, 1.2 million had a residence permit for at least 12 months. Ukrainian citizenship was the third (after Morocco and Turkey) in terms of the prevalence of non-EU citizenship.

In proportion to the increase in Ukrainian migrants, their remittances to Ukraine also grew. According to the NBU (Minfin, 2022), in 2020, migrant transfers to Ukraine amounted to \$11.9 billion, which is \$60 million more than the \$14 billion in 2019. The top three countries from which the most significant transfers were received in 2021 are Poland – \$4.3 billion, the United States – \$1.1 billion, and the UK – 0.8, respectively. In 2022, the volume of cash receipts decreased by \$1.05 million compared to the previous period, associated with the start of the Russian-Ukrainian war (Table 1).

Table 1. Money transfers to Ukraine from abroad, million dollars

Years	Volume of cash receipts			Dynamics of cash receipts
	total	salary	private transfers	(%, year-over-year)
2010	5,862	3,373	2,489	
2015	6,959	4,116	2,843	+18.7
2016	7,535	4,794	2,741	+8.3
2017	9,287	6,292	2,995	+23.3
2018	11,111	7,911	3,200	+19.6
2019	11,921	8,907	3,014	+7.3
2020	11,980	8,505	3,475	+0.5
2021	14,019	9,550	4,469	+17.0
2022	12,973	8,871	3,898	-7.5

Source: Minfin (2022).

Examining the structure of cash receipts in Ukraine, we note that almost a third are private transfers, money received from illegal employment. The economic function of unreported employment is reduced mainly to serving the needs of a large number of small and medium-sized enterprises in industrialized countries, which, unlike large ones, cannot apply expensive

labour-saving technologies on a large scale. Analysing the migration of domestic workers to the European Union until 2022, we noted that in some EU countries, the demand for such workers was unsatisfactory. As a result, there was a tacit promotion of using illegal employees at the government level. Of course, if the volume of illegal migration did not threaten countries' economic and political security.

Following the data on international migration, as carried out by the UN in 2020, Ukraine ranked 8th in the world among countries regarding the number of people who went abroad for work. From 5 to 5.5 million labour migrants left the country, while the expert community inside the country notes the figure at 3 million (Eurostat Statistics Explained, 2023). The difference of 2.5 million workers indicates the existing problem of the illegal migration of migrants and the unlikely possibility of earning more (Economic truth, 2023). The resolution of this problem will require the sovereign's hand to defend the rights of those practicing abroad and regulate the domestic market of practice. It was especially taking into account that by 2022 there was a tendency to stabilize unemployment within 10% and positive dynamics of demand in the job market in Ukraine.

The situation changed dramatically with the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), by January 3, 2023, about 4.9 million Ukrainian refugees received temporary protection status in European countries. This number is about 1% of the population of the EU countries and 15% of the population of Ukraine. Poland, Germany, and Romania accepted the most Ukrainians (Figure 3) (Oxford Economics, 2022).




Figure 3. EU countries that accepted the most refugees from Ukraine in 2022, in thousands Source: Oxford Economics (2022).

In May-November 2022, the UN Refugee Agency (2022) surveyed more than 43,000 migrant respondents, of whom 99% had Ukrainian citizenship. The study aimed to collect and analyse the dynamics of data on the profile and needs of refugees. The survey occurred in Poland, Belarus, Romania, Moldova, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Based on the study, it was determined that 85% of the respondents are children and women (Figure 4) with higher (46%) and vocational (29%) education. Before the war in Ukraine started, 81% of respondents were employed, 10% were retired, 6% were homemakers, 2% were unemployed, and 1% were students.




Figure 4. Age and gender structure of Ukrainian migrant respondents (2022) (%) Source: The UN Refugee Agency (2022).

Over 78% of respondents had to leave their husbands, 54% of whom were conscripted. Half of the respondents left their homes from late February to April 2022. Most of them migrated from the Odesa and Kharkiv regions (12%), Kyiv city (10%), and Dnipropetrovsk region (8%) (The UN Refugee Agency, 2022).

The study determined that only 12% of Ukrainians abroad lived with their relatives, 68% rented housing, and 28% were in temporary places for refugees at the time of the survey. 12% of families had a disabled dependent, and 11% migrated with elderly relatives of the risk group. The main problems that created obstacles for Ukrainians abroad were: obtaining cash (49%), finding a job (36%), and finding housing (33%).

During the study period, 63% of respondents indicated they did not plan to return to Ukraine shortly, citing danger as the main reason. Some such respondents had not yet decided on the future (14%), and those who plan to migrate to other countries (9%) (Figure 5).

Only 14% of Ukrainians reported that they plan to return home (89% of them to their region of residence) since the situation in the country has undergone positive changes (26%),

and they also have a better financial situation at home (13%). The results of this survey indicate that "war-induced" migration will negatively affect the domestic labour market because the most active working population does not yet plan to return to Ukraine.




Figure 5. Opinions of Ukrainian migrant respondents regarding their future (2022) (%) Source: The UN Refugee Agency (2022).

Similar negative results are indicated by a study conducted by the Centre for Economic Strategy (Centre for Economic Strategy, 2023). Among Ukrainian citizens who plan to return from the EU, there are more people over 65 years old, workers with a low level of education, and those who worked before the war (Figure 6).




Figure 6. Age structure of Ukrainian refugees (%) (2022)

Source: Centre for Economic Strategy (2023).

In the structure of migrants from Ukraine, 81.2% are workers of the most productive age 18–49, which creates prerequisites for a positive economic effect for the EU countries from their integration in the future. Thus, according to the statistical office of the Netherlands, 46% of the 65 thousand Ukrainian refugees as of November 1, 2022, were already officially employed and paid taxes (Ukrinform, 2023).

According to the study of the impact of Ukrainian migrants on the economy of Poland, conducted by Oxford Economics in 2022, if 650,000 Ukrainian migrants remain in Poland,

the labour force and potential GDP will grow by 1.2% by 2050 compared to the baseline forecast. If 1 million migrants remain working in Poland, the labour force and GDP will increase by 2% (Oxford Economics, 2022).

Experts from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimate the additional contribution to the annual GDP growth rate of the Czech Republic, Poland, and Estonia at 1.2% per year, and the contribution of migrants to the GDP of Hungary, Latvia, Slovakia, Lithuania, and Romania at almost 0.8%. Conversely, this situation will create negative consequences for the economy of Ukraine. Thus, the Deputy Minister of the Economy O. Soboliev notes that every 100 thousand people who do not return to Ukraine reduce the volume of GDP by 0.5% (BBC News Ukraine, 2023). According to the Centre for Economic Strategy, 860 thousand to 2.7 million Ukrainians may remain abroad, which will entail economic losses from 2.55% to 7.71% of GDP (Centre for Economic Strategy, 2023).

In addition to economic consequences, Ukraine is facing a demographic crisis. According to the statistics of the Director of the Institute of Demography of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine E. Libanova, one Ukrainian woman in 2023 will have 0.8 children, while the minimum level required for normal population reproduction is 2.2. However, the actual figures may be even lower (BBC News Ukraine, 2023). After all, those Ukrainian women who now find work in EU countries that will satisfy them will not return. Therefore, after the war ends, their husbands will leave for the EU to reunite with their families.


Besides, the war led to the loss of a significant number of skilled workers due to migration to neighbouring countries and death (including doctors, lawyers, teachers, engineers, IT specialists, and journalists) (The UN Refugee Agency, 2022). Therefore, it is now necessary to develop plans and measures at the state level aimed at restoring the economy and returning Ukrainians home, as well as attracting foreign labour resources to reconstruct the country.

Leveraging data on residence permits issued to Ukrainians by the Statistical Office of the European Union (Eurostat) over the past ten years, this study will forecast the evolution of the European and Ukrainian labour markets within a three-year horizon. To attain more reliable insights, we have selected a relatively short forecasting period, given the ongoing conflict, as its outcome will determine whether Ukrainians will return home (Figure 7).


In the projection of the number of Ukrainian migrants to European Union countries, we applied the extrapolation method utilizing trend lines (exponential, polynomial, and linear) and their graphical approximation (Figure 7). An analysis of the results reveals negative consequences for the Ukrainian labour market (Figure 7A and 7B). Among the three forecasts, only the linear trend line projects a decrease in Ukrainian migration to the EU over the next

three years (Figure 7B). These forecasts could be categorized as pessimistic, realistic, and optimistic. However, by examining the approximation values (R<sup>2</sup>), a conclusion can be drawn that the polynomial model (Figure 7A) offers the most reliable estimate, projecting a rise to


A) Polynomial trend line:  $y = 76.191x^2 - 585.58x + 1,809.8$ ,  $R^2 = 0.8457$ 



B) Linear trend line: y = 328.71x - 171.16,  $R^2 = 0.5959$ 



C) Exponential trend line:  $y = 595.56e^{0.1524x}$ ,  $R^2 = 0.7486$ 



☐ The total number of valid residence permits

Figure 7. Forecast of population migration from Ukraine to European Union countries Source: a forecast was made by the authors based on the data European Commission (2023).

nearly 9 million refugees within three years. For the Ukrainian labour market, this will have only negative consequences, leading to:

- 1. Escalation of dependence on external capital and assistance.
- 2. Diminution in the nation's resilience and stability, as the losses of human capital incurred during the Russian-Ukrainian conflict are severe and lack restorative potential.
- 3. Heightened probability of territorial losses and the extension of military operations into the territories of other sovereign states.

This forecast suggests potentially positive impacts on the European labour market, though, as, according to the aforementioned survey results, the majority of Ukrainian migrants are working-age adults with educational qualifications and youth. This influx of younger and qualified workers has the potential to mitigate the demographic challenges and workforce ageing currently faced by many EU countries.

Policymakers and researchers in Ukraine are actively developing programs to support internally displaced persons (IDPs) and formulating recommendations for post-war reconstruction. These efforts include measures to facilitate the return of Ukrainian citizens to their home regions. When forming recovery plans, policymakers are drawing on lessons learned from past reconstruction efforts in countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Croatia (Dnistrianskyi Center, 2023), as well as the reconstruction of Beirut following the 2020 explosion (Asaleye *et al.*, 2023). A particular focus is being placed on mobilizing and effectively utilizing financial assistance from international organizations and donors, alongside studying successful examples of population repatriation practices.

In Ukraine, the problem of repatriation was studied even before the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war because, taking into account the demographic situation of the last decades, scientists emphasized a labour shortage in the future. The developers of the Strategy of the State Migration Policy of Ukraine for the period up to 2025 (Order of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 2017) analysed the experience of North and South Korea (Han, 2022), the Philippines, Poland, Georgia, Moldova, and other countries (Schwartz *et al.*, 2022). However, in this document, this direction needs to be more developed, legislatively, and institutionally supported. Therefore, scientists and politicians now pay special attention to measures to stimulate the repatriation of citizens when formulating post-war recovery plans.

For example, the Green Marshall Plan for Ukraine was proposed by members of the United4Ukraine network (Euractiv, 2022). It is based on the rapid and sustainable economic

development of Ukraine and the whole of Europe in the 21st century due to the development of six main areas:

- emergency aid, restoration of critical infrastructure, and affected cities,
- economic integration and preparing Ukraine for EU membership,
- re-equipment of Ukrainian industry for decarbonized economic development,
- Ukraine's integration into European energy markets,
- transition of Ukraine to green energy,
- creating a powerful wave of employment with thousands of "green" jobs for Ukraine and EU member states.

The Government of Ukraine has developed the foundations of the Ukrainian Marshall Plan, which includes three stages and is designed for ten years (Economic truth, 2022). When forming this plan, the main emphasis was placed on "restoring the infrastructure destroyed by the war and building a completely new one – more efficient, modern and environmentally friendly." Moreover, one of the programs of this plan concerns social support and migration policy. However, this plan includes only a list of programs (measures) and their budget and requires detailing.

The totality of the indicated plans for the development of Ukraine requires the coordination of their measures and efforts of all subjects, which will create a synergistic effect for the domestic economy. At the same time, the recommendation of the adviser to the President of Ukraine on economic issues, Oleh Ustenko, and the former chief economist of the IMF, Simon Johnson, regarding the need to change the focus of attention of donor countries from helping refugees abroad to measures aimed at their repatriation and better adaptation in Ukraine, deserves attention (Los Angeles Times, 2022). Implementing the recommendation will relieve the social infrastructure of the asylum countries, and funds will be directed to the speedy return of refugees home to restore the country.

## Conclusions

Therefore, summarizing the existing world experience of the post-war recovery of countries and taking into account the critical demographic situation in Ukraine, we propose to join the efforts of the Government, international organizations, and donors to form a financial fund, the funds of which will be directed to the development of recommendations and the formation and implementation of programs for the return of Ukrainian citizens, solving problems of unemployment and restoration of the domestic labour market. At the same time,

it is mandatory to determine the time guidelines of the developed measures when forming proposals, taking into account the interests of all citizens of Ukraine, including those currently abroad and temporarily displaced persons. A detailed plan for the recovery of the domestic labour market should focus on the following:

- a) development of comprehensive plans for the recovery of economic sectors with constant support and control of relevant measures (with the division of responsibility between state and branch structures);
- b) formation and approval of general plans for the development of regions, with a clear demarcation of programs for the territories most affected during the war. Their structure should be focused on the primary reconstruction of destroyed housing and social infrastructure, which will facilitate the return of citizens to their homes;
- c) creation of favourable conditions for living, studying, retraining, and starting a business in the most affected areas in the first place;
- d) establishment of centres of psychological and mental assistance throughout the country;
- e) development of support programs for young families, which would contribute to the restoration of the positive dynamics of the birth rate in the country;
- f) improvement of migration policy to attract foreign workers to the domestic labour market.

The successful implementation of these programs and measures has the potential to facilitate the repatriation of Ukrainian citizens, alleviate unemployment pressures, and contribute to the restoration of a robust domestic labour market in the long term.

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