rss_2.0Sciendo RSS Feed for Journal of Nationalism, Memory & Language Politicshttps://sciendo.com/journal/JNMLPhttps://www.sciendo.comhttps://sciendo-parsed.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/64721e1d215d2f6c89dbc8e1/cover-image.jpghttps://sciendo.com/journal/JNMLP140216https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jnmlp-2023-0005<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>This paper investigates the reconstruction of Albanian identity in Kosovo after the region's transformation to state independence in 2008. The cultural environment emerged as a site of ethnic appropriation and contestation in the longstanding interethnic struggles between the Albanians and the Serbs. The study examines the socio-symbolic and linguistic manifestations of national identity in Pristina, the capital city of Kosovo, through the lens of Linguistic Landscape Studies. The first aspect of the study investigates M. Theresa Boulevard, the central promenade of the city and a site of memory and commemoration, to highlight how the period of South Slavic hegemony in Kosovo and the recent interethnic war resulted in a redefinition of Albanian identity. The second aspect of the study focuses on the written manifestation of the Gheg variety of Albanian as a symbol of Kosovo's independence. Through this dual focus on memory and language, the study aims to arrive at an understanding of how new national and political self-identifications are shaped in contexts that have undergone ethno-political conflicts and socio-political shifts. We argue that the symbolic configuration of Kosovo suggests a redefinition of Kosovo-based Albanian identity following the transformation to state independence. The study contributes to an understanding of the multi-layered redefinition of Albanian identity in Kosovo, calling attention to language and memory in the process of constructing national identities in postwar contexts.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jnmlp-2023-00052023-09-15T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jnmlp-2023-0004<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>The problem of language policy formation arises from combined efforts to achieve the long- term goals of civil peace and avoid ethnic conflicts. Globalization poses a range of challenges to society, such as migration and multiculturalism. However, the language situation in postcolonial developing countries is more complex than in developed ones. This paper analyzes the history of language policy in Kazakhstan by comparing the experiences of other post-Soviet countries and developed countries in Europe and North America. The study relies on comparative historical and conceptual analysis of language policies and population censuses. The paper also explores different approaches to language policy formation from influential researchers to highlight the most significant factors behind a successful language policy. The primary goal of language policy in Kazakhstan is to overcome the dominance of the Russian language without violating the rights and freedoms of ethnic groups. The country’s strategy involves promoting bilingualism to introduce the Kazakh language into all spheres of public life step by step. The results of the study may help other developing countries to shape their national language policies. They may also find applications in political science, futurology, and political forecasting.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jnmlp-2023-00042023-07-28T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jnmlp-2023-0003<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>In mainstream academic discourse, the emergence of national identities has mostly been explained from a powerful modernist approach, claiming that nations, as we know them today, are modern and constructed phenomena. This implies that the spotlight of research has been on interest-based homogenization motives and how they can create mass loyalty as an efficient socio-cultural basis for political elites and capitalist markets. Nevertheless, attention might be slightly diverted from the possible emotional and cognitive motives of national identities. According to the conceptualization in this paper, interest-based motives can be paired with these emotional and intellectual motives, together constituting a generally relevant tripartite concept of national self-identification, where emotionality can be revealed through the “irrational” separatist feature of modern nationalisms, while cognitive motives are embodied in the expectations towards nations to offer intellectually defendable meaningful explanations about a collective origin and “our” place within the world. Without questioning the significance of means-end rationality behind the national homogenization processes, all of this points to a rather interrelated entanglement of motives where the development of the attitude of “belonging to a nation” is fueled not solely by interest, but emotional (“separatist”) motives and cognitive-intellectual (“historizing”) motives alike. As a result, we can establish a conceptual framework, not stressing the primacy of any of these motives within nationalisms, but instead focusing on the possible ways in which interest-based need for homogenization can collude with the emotional need of cultural boundary-making (separatism) as well as with the intellectual need for coherent explanations of state of affairs (historicism).</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jnmlp-2023-00032023-07-28T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jnmlp-2023-0002<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>Since its irruption in Spanish public institutions in 2018, a new right-wing political party, Vox, has challenged the electoral spectrum of other parties under a nationalist form. This work justifies the classification of Vox within the so-called radical right based on the components of the party’s nativist and authoritarian positions. These premises are deployed in discourses on the Spanish language as the only linguistic axis capable of structuring the nation. Although similar arguments can be found in other right-wing, center-right, or center-left political parties in Spain, Vox explicitly shows its placement. Language policy in Spain fluctuates around two positions related to the legal nature of the official languages. On the one hand, Spanish is the official language of the State and is widely known by the population; on the other hand, linguistic officiality is shared with other languages in several regions. This legal and social situation implies that measures for the protection and promotion of regional languages are perceived as an attack on the vitality of Spanish. We propose an analysis of Vox’s discourse through three channels: first, the organic party documents, as the statutes or the electoral program; second, institutional and journalistic interventions of members with social significance; and third, the publications on Twitter of six relevant components of the party. This material reveals an attack on the linguistic policies of bilingual territories under the premise of Spanish as the common language that balances all citizens. Far from assuming a mere conjunction of particular political phenomena, Vox’s discourse articulates social loyalties, with a direct impact on the coexistence of people from different territories and speakers of different languages. Our purpose is, therefore, to unravel the ideological orientation and tone with which Vox transmits its discourse regarding the social relationship of minoritized languages in Spain with the most widespread language, Spanish.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jnmlp-2023-00022023-07-28T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jnmlp-2023-0001<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>If linguistic nationalism presupposes a homogenous national language, then “dialect” taxonomies become interesting objects of study. This article examines three instances of linguistic nationalism published in Zagreb. The three texts, published in 1836, 1919, and 1995, come from (1) Ljudevit Gaj and Jan Kollár, (2) Dragutin Prohaska, and (3) Miro Kačić. The different texts propound three quite different taxonomies of “dialects” within the imagined national language. Changing strategies of dialect classification imply different understandings of the national language, reflecting in turn changing political circumstances. The Panslavism of 1836 gave way in 1919 to interwar Yugoslavism, or alternatively Serbo-Croatism, which in 1995 then gave way to Croatian particularist nationalism. The article ends with speculations about future linguistic taxonomies.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jnmlp-2023-00012023-07-28T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jnmlp-2022-0010<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>In postwar Europe the remembrance of the Holocaust (קאַטאַסטראָפע <italic>Katastrofe</italic> in Yiddish) endows the continent’s societies and politics with a clear-cut moral dimension. All agree that remembering about and researching the Holocaust is necessary for preventing a repeat of the murderous past in the future. Yet, no reflection is really devoted to the most revealing fact that the wartime genocide’s main victims – Jews – exist no longer in Europe as a community with their specific Yiddish language and culture. Due to the twin-like closeness between Yiddish and German, prior to the war, Yiddish speakers ensured a world-wide popularity for the German language. After 1945, Yiddish-speaking Holocaust survivors and Jewish poets exorcised and reinvented the then-murderers’ language of German, so that poetry could be written in it again. In reciprocation, Germany and Europe – shockingly and quite incomprehensibly – abandoned their duty to preserve and cultivate Yiddish language and culture as a necessary “inoculation” against another genocide. Forgetting about this duty imperils Europe and its inhabitants; the danger now is sadly exemplified by Russia’s ongoing genocidal-scale war on Ukraine. Not a single Yiddish library exists in today’s Europe, which is an indictment in itself.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jnmlp-2022-00102022-12-05T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jnmlp-2022-0007<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>This paper analyzes how studies of a language and the language itself can be used as symbolic instruments to construct or support a differential ideological identity. The analyses of these studies have allowed us to undertake a sort of “archaeology” of the process of Basque ethnogenesis. All the authors instrumentalized philological studies as a way of expressing and claiming their ethnic identity, building their arguments on the basis of previous works (the “archaeological” layer being immediately underneath) at the same time that they reformulated them in order to better suit their specific conception of Basque identity as well as their particular sociopolitical interests. As if we were looking at a stratigraphic cut of an uninterrupted human settlement, the research unravels the existence of a narrative thread that, stratum upon stratum (that is, author upon author) connects the Basque chroniclers of the 16th to 18th centuries with the romantic <italic>fuerista</italic> writers of the 19th century, as well as Sabino de Arana-Goiri, the founder of the contemporary Basque Nationalist Party.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jnmlp-2022-00072022-10-01T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jnmlp-2022-0006<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>Research on the political aspect of the recognition of the Armenian genocide has mostly focused on the realpolitik and its impact in terms of legislation and relations between political actors. A new dimension in research regarding the Armenian genocide occurred by presenting legal performativity within memory laws in France and Germany. Here, I build on the understanding that performative analysis may help us uncover the deeper circumstances of the recognition of the Armenian genocide, going beyond the classical dichotomy—recognition/nonrecognition. The case of the Czech Republic revealed the problem in the division of executive power regarding foreign policy between the government and the president. Furthermore, the analysis revealed the parliamentary instruments legitimizing the recognition of the Armenian genocide.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jnmlp-2022-00062022-10-01T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jnmlp-2022-0011<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>This text brings into analytical focus the workings of whiteness within the politics regarding Ukrainian refugees in two neighboring countries, Austria and Czechia. This comparison aims to contextualize various racial hierarchies in which Ukrainian refugees are embedded, and to connect public discourses translated by mass media and critically accepted by scholars and experts with the personal experience of refugees and those recruited to help them in reception centers. We follow the layering and conversion of racial hierarchies through examining three interrelated realms of public policy: (1) the conflation of illiberal and liberal populisms concerning the Russian invasion and the subsequent refugee movements in the discursive practices of leading politicians and those responsible for refugee politics; (2) the intersectionality of gender, class, and race as a locus of control over Ukrainian women, who comprise the majority of those fleeing the country; and (3) elaborating an extreme case of forging whiteness, within the overt and covert racist practices concerning Ukrainian Romani refugees. To conclude, we discuss possible directions for future research that apply critical whiteness studies for understanding how racial hierarchies design public politics concerning refugees, and what can be done to minimize the injustices determined by whiteness.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jnmlp-2022-00112022-12-05T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jnmlp-2022-0005<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>Since the entry of the far-right party VOX into the Spanish government administrations in 2018, Spain's political scene has gone through a deep transformation. The disparity in opinions among the different parties concerning migration seems to tear the country's democratic foundation apart. This paper is a study of the language and discursive strategies used by VOX's leader, Santiago Abascal, articulating the party's populist propaganda for a united country to “make Spain great again.” The analysis was grounded on the theoretical underpinnings of <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="j_jnmlp-2022-0005_ref_052">Wodak's (2001)</xref> discursive strategies and <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="j_jnmlp-2022-0005_ref_017">Van Dijk's (1993)</xref> “<italic>Us” vs. “Them”</italic> framework. The data were based on Abascal's closing political campaign speech during the Madridlenian elections, which was televised in May 2021. The 30-minute video recording was transcribed, annotated, coded, and analyzed. The findings suggest a pattern of discursive practices aimed at diminishing other political parties and their representatives, vilify immigrants, and impugn government measures that were against VOX's authoritarian conservatism and nationalism. There was a predominant use of predication strategies to positively present VOX while denigrating its political rivals. Referential/nomination strategies were also used to divide the society between in-groups and out-groups. Strongly embedded in these strategies were perlocutionary acts used to incite hate toward the out-groups and evoke fear and anxiety toward the in-group, strategically employed as tools to gain votes in the elections.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jnmlp-2022-00052022-10-01T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jnmlp-2022-0012ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jnmlp-2022-00122022-12-31T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jnmlp-2022-0008<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>While nationalism theorists have mostly rejected primordialism, politicians and the wider public typically have a primordialist and essentialist understanding of national history. On the eve of Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin invoked several primordialist tropes so as to justify military action, which is unsurprising in a politician. Yet Western scholars criticizing Putin's historical narratives in newspaper editorials or in scholarly talks posted to YouTube only rarely suggest modernist or social constructivist historical narratives. Several posit counter-primordialisms instead. Primordialism, then, enjoys more support than is widely realized, even among scholars who ought to be familiar with its problems. Meanwhile modernist theorists of nationalism, however popular among nationalism theorists, require more vigorous promotion in academic circles.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jnmlp-2022-00082022-10-13T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jnmlp-2022-0009<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>Ukraine's national identity was born out of historical events which impacted the regions in Ukraine differently. In western and central parts of Ukraine, the people tend to be more pro-Western, while in the eastern and southern parts of the country, the people are more pro-Russian. This difference emerged from two approaches to the Ukrainian identity. The pro-Western part of the country believes that they were a separate nation from the Russians and should break ties with Russia. The pro-Russian part believes that the Ukrainians and the Russians are the same nation or two brotherhood nations that should stand together against outside threats.</p> <p>This paper will analyze which key historical events were the roots of the Ukrainian national identity and where the differences between the regional approaches are laying. This difference between pro-Western and pro-Russian attitudes influenced the Ukrainian political landscape from its independence until 2014. After the Revolution of Dignity, the occupation of Crimea, and the war in Donbas, the political situation started to change towards more pro-Western policies. The invasion in 2022 could be the final nail in the coffin of the Ukrainian-Russian brotherhood, and it might erase the last difference between the two parts of Ukraine.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jnmlp-2022-00092022-10-01T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jnmlp-2022-0001<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>Comparative research looks for “ethnic nationalism” to classify a party as either “extreme right” or “radical right.” “Ethnic nationalism” has turned into a common theoretical concept by way of various interpretations of Hans Kohn's work, developing a theoretical ethnic/civic contrast of national ideologies. The application of this dichotomy has been criticized for lack of theoretical depth that resulted in inaccurate analysis and, in some cases, harmful normative judgment. This article claims that this simple contrast between two types of national ideology omits complex theoretical views of nationalism that are neither civic nor ethnic, which are promoted mainly by the conservative right. By expanding Kohn's dichotomy into an “axis of ideological nationalism,” it offers a normative theoretical tool to be used in comparative politics, paving the way for a more comprehensive model of right-wing national ideology.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jnmlp-2022-00012022-02-27T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jnmlp-2022-0004<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>This study focuses on a discourse practice that metaphorically associates ISIS with an early Islamic sect known as the Kharijites. This practice constructs a discourse that calls back the background knowledge and memory of historical narratives and experiences that create conceptual frames that communicate meanings of war and atrocities. These meanings were used by King Abdullah II of Jordan to justify Jordan’s military participation against ISIS (circa 2014–2018). On the basis of the “blending theory” of conceptual metaphor, this study shows how the discourse practice of depicting ISIS as the Kharijites has undergone selective associations with the ideological aim of constructing persuasive and coercive discourses to justify military intervention against ISIS, primarily by foregrounding scripts of threat and victimization. That, in turn, leads to the instigation of illusive and incomplete associations.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jnmlp-2022-00042022-04-01T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jnmlp-2022-0002<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>This paper shows how history is rewritten in China by shaping the memories of its youth, who create new communities by sharing and renarrating new memories. They can become a powerful channel to convey an official interpretation of local histories to a larger public, by marginalizing and appropriating local narratives. The idea behind the program for voluntary narrators under analysis<fn id="j_jnmlp-2022-0002_fn_001" symbol="1"><p>“Explaining Dunhuang – 2019 University students’ summer programme to become voluntary narrator at Mogao grottoes”. The original name of the program in Chinese is Jieshuo Dunhuang – 2019 <italic>Mogao ku gaoxiao shuqi zhiyuan jiangjieyuan</italic> 解说敦煌·2019莫高窟高校暑期志愿讲解员.</p></fn> is to shape memories of China’s young and wealthy students about a place, by transforming its rich cross-cultural fundamentals, symbolic and inner meanings, into a representation of the Nation, able to convey powerful declinations of official narratives on the history of China. The analysis is conducted in consideration of the larger context of the construction and transmission of the official discourse on national identity in contemporary PRC. Specifically, the author provides evidence of how young Chinese internalize and disseminate the party line on Chineseness, and the subordinate role assigned within this process to “minorities.” Minorities are seen both as a threat and an opportunity: a threat to the Party and social cohesion as carriers of diverse identities, an opportunity for contrasting Chineseness with the Other, a backward entity, inadequate and unable to embrace—if not help—the path to modernity.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jnmlp-2022-00022022-03-07T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jnmlp-2022-0003<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>While studies on nations and nationalism have brilliantly demonstrated the influence of collective memory on national development, few studies have examined the reciprocity of this relationship. This article is therefore concerned with the laborious processes of memorizing the founding myths of both the Irish and Québécois nations. Indeed, while today the rebellion of 1798 in Ireland and those of 1837–1838 in Québec are central to their respective processes of identity-building, it has not been a calm process; the 1798 rebellion was buried in collective amnesia for almost a century and in Québec, the <italic>Patriotes</italic> rebellions have constantly moved in and out of collective memory. I argue, in this article, that the unstable definition of both nations harmed the process of remembrance. I am therefore interested in the long and conflicting journey that has enabled the Irish and Québécois nations to define themselves, respectively, by their religion and their language. Through a historiographical analysis of the speeches from several leaders of these two nationalist movements, this article shows how nations define and redefine themselves and how memories are also altered to meet those changes.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jnmlp-2022-00032022-03-07T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jnmlp-2021-0011<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>This paper establishes a dialogue between populism studies, typologies of reconstruction of the past, and argumentative dialectics. The paper analyzes what types of argumentative strategies are employed in the context of the discussions regarding Spanish memory politics and how those strategies can be associated with typologies of re-elaboration of the past (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="j_jnmlp-2021-0011_ref_009">Caramani and Manucci 2019</xref>). Building from argumentative dialectics (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="j_jnmlp-2021-0011_ref_058">Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004</xref>), the paper studies argumentation structures uttered after the endorsement of the 2007 Spanish Historical Memory Law and the proposal of the 2021 Draft Democratic Memory Law. Departing from the distinction between diverse strategies of re-elaboration of the past, namely, heroization and cancellation (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="j_jnmlp-2021-0011_ref_009">Caramani and Manucci 2019</xref>), the paper questions if Spanish decision-makers’ rhetorical strategies and political decisions in the field of memory politics disclose the adoption of particular types of populist behavior. The paper claims that the argumentative tactics used, in the domain of memory politics, by Spanish left-wing leaders reveal the adoption of a heroization strategy. In contrast, the rhetoric of Spanish right-wing leaders favors a strategy of cancellation. The paper also claims that, in the Spanish case, mainly from 2018 onwards, the adoption by Spanish left-wing leaders of a heroization strategy had two consequences. First, it did not reduce the cultural opportunity structure for right-wing populism. Second, it fostered a cultural opportunity structure for the affirmation of left-wing populism. The paper selected argumentative dialectics as a methodological framework (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="j_jnmlp-2021-0011_ref_058">Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004</xref>). The paper discusses the scientific significance of analyzing memory politics through the lenses of populism studies.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jnmlp-2021-00112021-12-03T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jnmlp-2021-0001<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p><xref ref-type="bibr" rid="j_jnmlp-2021-0001_ref_012">Carol Fadda-Conrey (2014)</xref> points out that Arab American literature emerged remarkably in the early years of the 21st century, accompanying various political events and turmoil in either the USA or the Arab world, particularly the Middle East. One of the key aspects of this ethnic literature is the manifestation of the Arab national identity and the call for unity and solidarity among kin Arab communities, whether locally or across borders. This paper, as such, by taking Diana Abu-Jaber’s novel <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="j_jnmlp-2021-0001_ref_001"><italic>Crescent</italic> (2003)</xref> as an example of the Arab American fiction produced in the contemporary era, examines the components of nationalism as expressed from afar – long-distance nationalism. This type of national propensity has received little attention in contemporary literary studies. In addition to using critical and analytical approaches to the novel, this paper basically relies on a socioconceptual framework based on the perspectives of prominent theorists and critics, such as Carol Fadda-Conrey, Nina Glick Shiller, Gabriella Elgenius, and Tololyan Khachig, to name a few.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jnmlp-2021-00012021-05-13T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jnmlp-2021-0010<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>Due to the recent attempts to divide Czech society based on the antagonism between Prague and the countryside, this study researches some of the aspects of this division—basic human values and the national identity of the inhabitants of Prague. These very basic level sources of the antagonism are researched via a combination of ISSP (National identity III module) and ESS (Round 8) surveys and two focus groups with Prague inhabitants. The results show that there are no real, or wrongly interpreted, differences between Praguers and people in the countryside with respect to both basic human values and Czech national identity. Regarding the basic human values of the two groups, only the conservation value dimension is stronger outside Prague. However, this value dimension is inherently ambiguous because its value of security is stronger within Prague, which is in contrast to values of conformity and tradition that are stronger outside Prague. In addition to this, conservation is still the stronger dimension within Prague compared with the openness to change value dimension. Praguers are rather compelled to be open and they are capable of adapting, even if their values are more conservative. The same values prevail among people within and outside Prague, which has been confirmed in the focus groups. There are also more similarities between the two groups in their national identities, e.g., when they are less nationalistic than patriotic. Both groups are of similar strength for patriotism and nationalism. The sources of national pride among the two groups are very similar and Praguers are those who can be labeled as being prouder in a few of the aspects of the Czech nation. The division between Praguers and non-Praguers seems to be rather artificial and based on inaccurate perceptions and/or interpretations.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jnmlp-2021-00102021-10-26T00:00:00.000+00:00en-us-1