rss_2.0Sciendo RSS Feed for Phainomenonhttps://sciendo.com/journal/PHAINOMENONhttps://www.sciendo.comhttps://sciendo-parsed-data-feed.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/616dfb40f1bf552d2b0f4bf9/cover-image.jpghttps://sciendo.com/journal/PHAINOMENON140216https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2022-0008ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2022-00082023-03-07T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2022-0012<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>This work starts by unfolding Levinas’ legacy from Bergson to phenomenology. Particularly, the article explores how Levinas deeply understood the meaning of Husserl’s transcendental idealism of <italic>Ideas</italic> I. He adheres to Husserl’s re(con)duction to the transcendental, understood by Levinas as the sense of existence overlooked by the naturalist ontology. Finally, it develops the Levinasian continuation of genetic phenomenology and its conclusion, that is, the irreducibility of ethical responsibility.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2022-00122023-03-07T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2022-0009<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>This paper focuses on Carl Stumpf’s evaluation of Husserl’s phenomenology in his <italic>Logical Investigations</italic> and in the first book of <italic>Ideas</italic>. I first examine Stumpf’s reception of the phenomenology of the <italic>Logical Investigations</italic>. I then turn to §§ 85-86 of <italic>Ideas</italic>, in which Husserl seeks to distinguish his “pure” phenomenology from Stumpf’s phenomenology. In the third part, I examine Stumpf’s critique of the new version of phenomenology that Husserl develops in his <italic>Ideas</italic> in §13 of <italic>Erkenntnislehre</italic>, and, in the fourth part, I examine the Spinozist interpretation of noetic-noematic correlations in Stumpf’s two studies of Spinoza. I conclude by asking whether the version of phenomenology that Husserl elaborates on during the Freiburg period does not anticipate, to some extent, Stumpf’s criticisms while confirming the latter’s diagnosis of the phenomenology of <italic>Ideas</italic>.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2022-00092023-03-07T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2022-0013<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>An attempt to bring Husserl’s phenomenology and psychopathology closer, based on the text of § 49 of the Ideen. What is an experience of annihilation of the world? How is a world undone? We will focus on the examples of the end of the world described in the stories of Gérard de Nerval and in the patients of Wolfgang Blankenburg.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2022-00132023-03-07T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2022-0014<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>Countless scholars have wrestled with the ambiguities and complexities in determining the role of the noema in Husserl’s theory of intentionality since his transcendental turn, and consequently converted what was intended to be a structural solution to a problem into a contested problem itself.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="j_phainomenon-2022-0014_fn_001">¹</xref> Shifting emphasis from the ‘whatness’, or ontological concerns of the correlate noesis—noema to the ‘howness’, or methodological force of phenomenology, allows me to discuss two things. The first is theological. Before and since Janicaud’s pronouncement of the ‘theological turn’ in phenomenology, the intentionality thesis has been rejected as a means to account for certain experiences given differently to object-phenomena (Janicaud, 2000). In accounting for religious experience as a complex movement between faith and doubt, my work reaches not for the ‘essence of phenomenality’ (Marion), or a givenness beyond intuition made invisible, nor does it seek to describe a transcendence beyond immanence, or proof in the existence of a god/gods, rather it concerns itself with the processes and underlying structures of belief. Arguably by focusing upon the noetic and noematic structure of intentional acts, intentional analysis is revitalised for delineating the belief modalities of faith and doubt in religious experiences.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2022-00142023-03-07T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2022-0010<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>What, if any, are the limits of the Husserlian concept of <italic>Gegebenheit</italic>? Is there a limit beyond which nothing can be seen by the phenomenologist? In asking these questions, we allude to a distinction typical of Kantian criticism: “<italic>Grenze</italic>” or “<italic>Schranke</italic>”, limit or boundary? These same questions are reformulated in a famous review of <italic>Ideen</italic> I by Paul Natorp, a Marburg neo-Kantian who directly attacks the unlimited scope Husserl gives to the phenomenological principle of intuition. From a phenomenological point of view, however, the Achilles’ heel of the critical method lies in the impossibility of accessing by intuition, beyond phenomena, the thing-in-itself. A major consequence is that the phenomenological dissolution of the “<italic>Grenze</italic>” prescribes a limitless opening to the horizon of phenomena. But if we can speak of a limitless openness, it is because in a certain way everything gives itself to be seen. What kind of vision is this? And what kind of <italic>Gegebenheit</italic> is at work here? The Husserlian answer lies in the recovery of a concept, the “idea in the Kantian sense”, without its counterpart, the “limit”, whereas for Kant as well as for Natorp it is precisely the concept of “limit” that characterizes the gnoseological status of the “idea”.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2022-00102023-03-07T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2022-0011<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>In 1931 Husserl writes and publishes the Epilogue to his <italic>Ideas</italic>, where he aims to explain the core of his work. Aware that this is his a legacy which must be carried forward, he seeks to preserve it from what he calls “the mistaken views” found in the new ways of conducting phenomenology. Our text underlines the polemic side of Husserl’s project, which is basically but tacitly against Heidegger, and sustains that this auto-interpretive piece is a fundamental key within Husserl’s corpus, where he defines the direction of his phenomenological project. At the center of the controversy are the answers to the objections of intellectualism and solipsism, and the disavowal of all forms of anthropologism in the conception of subjectivity.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2022-00112023-03-07T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2022-0003<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>I here present and discuss Husserl’s clarification of the genesis of modern empirical science, particularly its mathematical methods, as presented in his last work, <italic>The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology.</italic> Although Husserl’s analyses have as their goal to redirect science to the lifeworld and to reposition man and his immediate experiences at the foundation of the scientific project so as to overcome the “crisis” of science, I approach them from a different perspective. The problem that interests me here is the applicability of mathematics in empirical science, to assess Husserl’s treatment of this issue in order to see if it can be sustained from a strictly scientific point of view regardless of philosophical adequacy. My conclusion is that it cannot. What Husserl takes as the “crisis” of science is inherent to the best scientific methodology.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2022-00032022-10-08T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2022-0002<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>This paper is concerned with the reappraisal of Husserl’s ontology and epistemology, sketched in book one of <italic>Ideen.</italic> The main issue is Husserl’s theory of essence and essential insight. I present the fundamental distinction between facts and essences, and, over and above it, Husserl’s defense of an <italic>a priori</italic> knowledge based on essential insight as well as his partition of the whole realm of <italic>a priori</italic> knowledge into a formal set of material, regional ontologies. I will show how the theory of essential insight presented in <italic>Ideen</italic> gives rise to several criticisms, namely those made by Neo-Kantians, like Rickert and Natorp. In the last part, I will show how the mathematical concept of an invariant under a group of variations was the leading case for Husserl’s mature notion of eidetic insight.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2022-00022022-10-08T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2022-0006<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>This article analyses the fundamental relationship between Husserl’s theory of reflection in the first volume of <italic>Ideas</italic> pertaining to a pure phenomenology and the two main concepts upon which transcendental phenomenology is grounded: namely, description and reduction. Although the concept of reflection was already used in <italic>Logical Investigations</italic>, Husserl revised it entirely thanks to his analysis of time-consciousness in the 1905 Lectures. Reflection thus appears as a key concept in understanding the ‘turn’ that led Husserl to deeply modify his descriptive method in order to move to transcendental phenomenology.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2022-00062022-10-08T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2022-0004<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>In the first part of my paper, we will journey through the general structure of the first volume of Ideas, from which we will be able to deduce the position of Volume II. After carrying out a general analysis of the noesis/noema correlation structure in Section III and having provided, in Section IV, the basics of a phenomenology of reason, the second volume of Ideas should study the general fields in which the objects of transcendental experience appear: the world, the animal being, and the spiritual or cultural being. The third, unwritten volume should have been devoted to the study of the superior products of culture, and science. Thus, the second part of this paper will show the place of Ideas’ second volume. The third part, the decisive one, will inquire into the position of the world and the place of the body and culture. Specifically, it will ask whether the experience of the body is understood to be an objective genitive or whether it is also understood, necessarily, as a subjective genitive. The same question will be asked about culture. An understanding of one as objective or subjective genitive radically alters the meaning of the pure ego.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2022-00042022-10-08T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2022-0001ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2022-00012022-10-08T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2022-0005<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>In this paper, I address Husserl’s theory of intentionality focusing on the problems of attention. I claim that without phenomenological reduction the specific phenomenological content of modalizations – in intentional acts – would be hard to explain. It would be impossible to understand why constant external factors (for instance, variations in the intensity of a stimulus) are accompanied by fluctuations in attention. It would also be impossible to understand the reasons why only the lived experience of causality – which I sharply distinguish from causality in the psychophysical sense of the term – transforms attention into a factor that allows the understanding of a situation by the subject who lives that experience. I claim at last that only the genetic analysis of Husserl’s late Freiburg period, with its distinction between primary and secondary attention, gives a full account of the relation between the thematic object, focused on an intentional attentive act, and the horizon that surrounds the object and gives it its ultimate meaning.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2022-00052022-10-08T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2022-0007<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>This paper reads Husserl’s phenomenology as an attempt to solve the crisis of our civilization. It is well known that for him the deep roots of this crisis are related to a misunderstanding of the idea of rationality that leads to skepticism and relativism. It is also well known that in order to overcome this situation Husserl will propound a new idea of reason and rationality that will supposedly fulfill the old dream with which philosophy was born in Greece: To be <italic>episteme</italic>, rigorous science valid at all times and in all places. Taking this general thesis into account, the paper will defend that Husserl is a foundationalist thinker and that the idea of philosophy as <italic>strenge Wissenschaft</italic> is present throughout his whole work, including, of course, <italic>Ideen</italic> I. This in some way “classic” interpretation tries to discuss other recent ways of understanding the whole Husserlian project, particularly Dan Zahavi’s reading, in which the foundationalist position is downplayed.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2022-00072022-10-08T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2021-0017<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>The novel gives us access to fictional universes in a fundamentally unfinished mode, which allows the reader to give free rein to his or her imagination, in a freedom that is nevertheless monitored and controlled by rules. This article tries to understand the nature of this incompleteness, by discussing some classical readings. How does this specific dimension of fiction relate to Umberto Eco’s concept of the “open work” or to the idea, developed by the phenomenologist Roman Ingarden, that literary works are “schemas” destined to be “concretized” in the consciousness of the reader? How does Hans Robert Jauss’s aesthetics of reception help us to think about the incompleteness of the work in the proper time of its different readings? Through the fruitful dialogue of these different theories, it is a question of highlighting two important points. First, these theories, while discussing the respective roles of the author and the reader, neglect a a third character who is nevertheless essential to the fictional narrative, the narrator. However, taking into account the latter sheds light on the problems encountered. Secondly, this relationship between the incompleteness of the narrative and the narrator’s position is not in itself specific to fiction. It is not absent from scientific texts, when they are thought of as narratives about reality susceptible of different readings in their history.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2021-00172021-05-17T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2021-0013<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>This paper aims to investigate the importance of literature in Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s reflections concerning two strictly connected phenomenological themes: 1) the virtuality of objects and of existence itself; 2) the genesis of truth and the intuition of essences. According to Merleau-Ponty, modern novelists have adopted a phenomenological method: instead of ‘explaining’ the world through words, they ‘show’ the lifeworld and its paradoxes indirectly. In his view, and against Jean-Paul Sartre’s position, analyzing literature means developing a theory integrating perception and the imagination. Moreover, at the beginning of the 1950’s, this perspective led Merleau-Ponty to a deep revision of the Sartrian concepts of spontaneity and engagement in literary practice in favour of a theory of expression as style. As a conclusion, the paper argues for the key-role of literature in Merleau-Ponty’s indirect ontology as a way of rediscovering unity and harmony behind the metamorphosis of reality.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2021-00132021-05-17T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2021-0011ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2021-00112021-05-17T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2021-0012<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>This paper intends to offer a first sketch of a pluralist account of contemporary phenomenologies “of” literature. It does so (1) by distinguishing two phenomenological “families” — hermeneutical phenomenology and constitutive phenomenology —, illustrated by two different authors — Ricœur and Husserl —, each of which relies on a distinctive account of the notion of “phenomenon”— <italic>qua</italic> hidden entity providing the ground for what shows itself first and foremost, and <italic>qua</italic> intended unity of a multiplicity of conscious experiences —; (2) by fleshing out the two conceptions of “imagination” — productive imagination and <italic>phantasia</italic> — these accounts of the “phenomenon” give rise to; and finally, (3) by underlining the way in which these two phenomenological accounts lead to alternative ways of apprehending the specific phenomenon of fictional imagination — narrative literary imagination vs. reproductive <italic>phantasia</italic> of the narrative work — thus specifying two relevant senses in which the tasks of a “phenomenology <italic>of</italic> literature” could be understood. Such a complex path should enable us to justify the following claim: while hermeneutical phenomenology “of” literature aims at uncovering literature itself <italic>as</italic> a form of phenomenology, a constitutive phenomenology “of” literature rather understands its task as a way to clarify the fundamental concepts of a whole host of theoretical and practical disciplines <italic>about</italic> literature. Hence the ambiguity of the genitive “phenomenology <italic>of</italic> literature”, which could be read either as ascribing phenomenology <italic>to</italic> literature itself (subjective genitive), or as turning phenomenology <italic>towards</italic> literature (objective genitive). In its conclusion, this paper will tentatively assess the resources of a Husserl-inspired constitutive phenomenology of literature.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2021-00122021-05-17T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2021-0019<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>This article undertakes a comparative study of Ingarden and Derrida in regards to literature. It is being shown that the former’s concepts of ‘spots of indeterminacy’ and ‘empty spots’ resemble the latter’s notions of ‘spacing’ and ‘blanks’. Yet, although they both share a background in Husserlian phenomenology, it is argued that their ideas can hardly be equated to one another. Moreover, Derrida seemed to have avoided any association with Ingarden. This is due to their fundamentally different take on the literary work. Whereas Ingarden mainly considered the ontological nature of literature, Derrida took into account the broader context of the world in which literature takes place. For Ingarden, Derrida would have strayed too far from the subject matter. For Derrida, Ingarden hardly understood its complexity and only examined a small fragment of the issue: the question what makes us grasp literature as such. To Ingarden, those aspects were essential. To Derrida, they were merely objective rules.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2021-00192021-05-17T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2021-0015<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>This paper insists on similarities between Heidegger’s presentation of Dasein’s authentic understanding of time in <italic>Being and Time</italic> (§§ 79-80) and Thomas Mann’s attempts to “narrate time itself” in <italic>The Magic Mountain.</italic> It shows that Thomas Mann’s temporal experiments can contribute to a phenomenology of temporality, not merely by “illustrating” philosophical theses, but also by achieving something that goes beyond any phenomenological consideration on time: the enactment of fundamental temporal experiences.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2021-00152021-05-17T00:00:00.000+00:00en-us-1