rss_2.0Phainomenon FeedSciendo RSS Feed for Phainomenon Feed das Presentificações Totêmicas. Na Sequência de Posições e Repercussões da Carta de Husserl a Lévy-Bruhl<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>This article focuses on possible convergences between phenomenology and anthropology and underlines their contributions to the analysis of a specific topic. In its reconstructive dimension it departs from Edmund Husserl’s positions in the letter he addressed to Lucien Lévy-Bruhl in 1935, in particular on the relationship between humanity and the surrounding word <italic>(Umwelt)</italic> and on the opposition between historical societies and primitive ahistorical societies. After having noted some critical points emerging from Husserl’s considerations, this text retraces some of its repercussions on the thought of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jacques Derrida, whose diverging interpretations open up different ways of examining the relationship between the respective phenomenological and anthropological perspectives. Finally, with the aim of rethinking the contributions of these two fields to address the problem of the co-participation and the differentiations between the archaic and the current in descripted social structures by Lévy-Bruhl, this text turns to the specific temporality of totemic presentifications, which should become phenomenologically more detailed.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtrue and the Project of a Phenomenology of the Social World<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>In this paper, I discuss the guidelines of a phenomenology of the social world in the wake of Alfred Schutz and José Ortega y Gasset. While the latter was not, for a long time, acknowledge as a phenomenologist, the former is a well-known critique of Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity and of the possibility of grounding a community of transcendental Egos. Both, however, remained faithful to some basic phenomenological tenets, namely, that individual subjectivity has a relational character, the circumstances in which men live are a part of their life, and life is characterized by its openness to the world. On this basis, they both carried out a phenomenological description of social existence, stressing its two main assumptions: 1) there are things that must be taken for granted; 2) habitualities, typical constructions, and systems of relevance are the primary ways of dealing with social events and other fellow citizens. In different ways, they both showed that the traditional objections opposed to phenomenology regarding its capacity to address mundane human existence stemmed from a misunderstanding of its basic tenets and intentions.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtrue y Crisis de la Racionalidad. Reflexiones Fenomenológicas sobre Mercantilización, Matematización del Valor y Desinterés por el Mundo de la Vida<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>According to Husserl, the mathematization of the lifeworld involves reducing it, as object of knowledge, to what is measurable, as well as excluding other forms of knowledge of it. This has important implications in relation to the modern conception of rationality, and, significantly, of practical rationality. More precisely, it issues in an impoverishment of the notion of reason. This article examines the idea that the process of commodification associated with the consolidation and expansion of capitalism has motivated another aspect of the mathematization of nature to which Husserl alludes: the mathematization of value. Born from capitalist economy and from practical attitudes, this mathematization of value is a tendency to reduce all value to use value. In such context, this article offers a phenomenological reflection on the crisis of modern rationality, especially in relation to the difficulty to undertake collective actions that follow logics that are different from that of the accumulation of capital, based on the examination of this other aspect of the mathematization of the lifeworld.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtrue and Human Rights<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>In this article, I present the phenomenological tradition as a new grounding for human rights as universal rights. The hypothesis defended is to conciliate Husserl’s phenomenological method, and Reinach’s <italic>a priori</italic> law in order to offer a new grounding to human rights. Combining Husserl and Reinach’s ideas, I propose to expand the comprehension of <italic>a priori.</italic> It would be present as <italic>eidos</italic> of each object, and I name it as material <italic>a priori;</italic> it also be present in the <italic>eidetic relations</italic> and I name it as formal <italic>a priori.</italic> Yet the object would have an essence, a necessary content, a material <italic>a priori,</italic> and necessary states of affairs, necessary relations and connections, a formal <italic>a priori.</italic> Reinach, in <italic>The A priori Foundations of the Civil Law,</italic> describes eidetic relations, such as the relation between promise, claim, and obligation. I propose three eidetic universalities to ground law; these are what I will call human rights. I also face a few difficulties presented by DuBois and De Vecchi derived from the amoral approach of <italic>a priori</italic> laws. Then, I highlight the difference between this proposition and Albert’s. Finally, I defend the proposition that <italic>a priori</italic> laws are beyond natural and positive laws.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtrue and the Absence of Hostility: Interpretation and Defense of Gerda Walther’s Account<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>According to Gerda Walther, a community arises only if positive feelings, which she calls inner unification, eliminate hostilities among people. There are two objections to this claim, which one can develop from Aron Gurwitsch’s critical examination of Walther’s account. The present paper aims to respond to those objections and, through this, to clarify her account of community. To this end, the author deals with Walther’s brief remark on a “pathological” form of community and her accounts of inner unification. Considering those two factors, the author further shows that Walther’s idea is more plausible than it initially may appear. Contrary to what Gurwitsch seems to think, her account of communities allows for conflict and even certain types of hostility within a community.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtrue and the Social World: Presentationão sobre as «Meditações Cartesianas» de Husserl uma língua por inventar, A De Derrida figuras da Intersubjectividade em Husserl Husserl -A Quinta Meditação Cartesiana crítica de Derrida à teoria da significação de Husserl<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>This paper follows Derrida’s criticism, in <italic>The Voice and the Phenomenon,</italic> of Husserl ‘s conception of meaning as ideality and identity.</p> <p>The french author contests the ideality and supratemporality·of meaning, its separation from the meaning conferring act, and defends the inclusion of the following indicative dimensions of the last in the former: 1) the sensible element of the linguistic sign (namely in the ideal form of the word, that is in the expression) 2) the manifestation and communication of the experience or act (in the conscience as such) 3) the sensible and empirical content of experience, be it sensational, perceptive, imaginative or potentially and mediatelly intended (in the meaning itself).</p> <p>He questions, moreover, having asserted its temporal condition, which also derives, nevertheless, from some assertions by Husserl, the possibility of constitution of a «strict» and «true» identity, stating that intuitive presence is unable to form both the total covering between the intended and the fulfilling meaning, and the abstract ideality that would be function of the possibility of an infinite repetition, instead of conditioned by a “finite-infinite” one.</p> <p>Finally, he explains better the relation between the sensible face of sign and the ideality of meaning, the former’s place and role within the differentiation and repetition process. He notes that it is an ‘originary’ lack in thinking and meaning itself that claims for the linguistic sign (‘supplement of origin’), “in succession” for its ideal form and its sensible oral and written elements, without ever reaching any completion (‘ supplementarity’, ‘differe(a)nce’). We also attend the derridean hypothesis of writing as the consummation of the link between ideality and death, the last one being considered as having a special relation to sensibility and difference.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtrue Y Comunicación<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>This paper analyzes the concept of alterity in the thought of Emmanuel Levinas and its importance to make a critic of the ethical ones of dialogical inspiration. As opposed to the conception of the intersubjective relations founded on in a previous community, the alterity concept shows the necessity to think the sense to us of the ethics from the other.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtrue e intersoggettività. Nel Periodo Intermedio Del Pensiero di Maurice Merleau-Ponty e pessoa et Pertinence<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>It is question in this text of analyzing the intention to mean something to somebody in the light of the husserlian concept of intentionality. The communication is described there as aiming at the cooperation between the persons by means of ostensive appearance of some of their intentions, on the foundation of the desire of recognition. The constituent role of the communication for any Community is put in it in evidence.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtrue et la théorie réaliste de la vérité<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Summary</title> <p>The author deals with the Brentanian theory of truth, as it is sketched in <italic>On the concept of truth</italic> (1889). He shows how, although entrenched in a deep sense of “real”, this theory moves away from the traditionally to realism assigned “correspondence theory”. Following Brentano and carrying out a systematic comparison of his views to Austin’s ones, he investigates how far, in fact, a strict realism is incompatible with any kind of”correspondence theory”. On the other side, he tries to make some sense of the idea of a truth as “adequacy”.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtrue Heretical Conception of the European Heritage in the Late Essays of Jan Patočka<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>In this short piece I am not undertaking to give a full discussion of the whole of Patočka’s “heretical” work. I wish only make clear its most essential core. What, in Patočka’s view, made Europe <italic>Europe</italic> and what is Europe’s bequest to the world after what Patočka describes as its fall, completed by the two world wars? What should Europe look to conserve in itself if- as seems likely - it would like to once again play a respected role in world events? Is there something which the globalised world should take over from old Europe, or something which it should eschew, if it does not wish history to end and utter decadence to ensue?</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtrue esboço da teoria da comunicação de Alfred Schütz<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>Throughout about three decades of incessant research, the Austrian phenomenologist Alfred Schutz tried to specify the concept of meaning presented in an insufficient way by Max Weber in his famous definition of subjective action. Quickly, Schutz exceeded the methodological questions related with the foundation of Social Sciences, developing an elaborated reflection on the relations between Communication and Society. Along this text, are presented some particularly significant moments of this intellectual journey, such as the schtuzian reflection on intersubjectivity; the question of communication as condition of possibility of the life-world, and, finally, the analysis of appresentational reference and the set of linguistic artefacts (marks, indications, signs and symbols) that allows man to deal with the experience of transcendence.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtrue Tempo e