rss_2.0Sciendo RSS Feed for Studia Humanahttps://sciendo.com/journal/SHhttps://www.sciendo.comhttps://sciendo-parsed.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/64737ad64e662f30ba53f9ef/cover-image.jpghttps://sciendo.com/journal/SH140216https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/sh-2024-0021<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>In contemporary American cinema, the representation of women remains disproportionately limited despite significant social movements advocating for diversity and equality. This study examines the depiction of women in top-grossing films of 2018, contrasting those directed by men with those directed by women, to understand the influence of gender dynamics on cinematic portrayal. Analyzing the top five highest-grossing live-action movies directed by each gender, this research utilizes critical mass and critical actor theories to evaluate the impact of female filmmakers on the representation of women both on and off-screen. Findings reveal that films directed by women feature higher percentages of female characters and crew members in key roles, yet face substantial budgetary and box office disparities compared to their male-directed counterparts. Despite some progress, the film industry continues to exhibit systemic biases, necessitating further structural changes to achieve genuine gender equality in cinematic storytelling. This study underscores the need for increased opportunities and resources for female filmmakers to foster a more inclusive and diverse cinematic landscape.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/sh-2024-00212024-07-29T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/sh-2024-0020<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>This paper critically examines the claim that Utah is “the most sexist state” in the United States, as suggested by a WalletHub report ranking it lowest in “Women’s Equality.” Utilizing an economic analysis from the Austrian School perspective, this study scrutinizes the data, metrics, and conclusions of reports by the Utah Women &amp; Leadership Project (UWLP). The analysis focuses on distinguishing statistical disparities from sexism, proposing that observed gender inequalities in Utah are largely influenced by cultural and economic factors, particularly the state’s high marriage rate and traditional gender roles. Contrary to the notion that sexism predominantly drives gender disparities, the paper argues that personal choices and subjective value theory play significant roles in shaping these outcomes. The study highlights the importance of considering cultural context, individual preferences, and the marital asymmetry hypothesis when interpreting gender-related data, challenging the assertion that Utah’s gender disparities are primarily due to sexist attitudes. The findings suggest that Utah’s gender gaps in areas such as income and workforce participation are more accurately attributed to the state’s unique cultural and economic landscape rather than pervasive sexism.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/sh-2024-00202024-07-29T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/sh-2024-0023<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>The interview given by Matti Häyry, PhD, Professor of Philosophy of Management at the Aalto University School of Business. Prof. Häyry has been involved in reproductive ethics and antinatalist philosophy since 1984. His 2004 A rational cure for prereproductive stress syndrome is considered to be the first expression of the so-called risk argument against procreation. His most recent publications on the topic, with Amanda Sukenick, include Imposing a lifestyle: A new argument for antinatalism and <italic>Antinatalism, Extinction, and the End of Procreative Self-Corruption</italic>. The origin and evolution of his views have been chronicled in detail on The Exploring Antinatalism Podcast, especially in its episode #65 and in episodes #1, #2 and #3 of its subchannel Hankikanto – Falling into the Anti/Natal Abyss.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/sh-2024-00232024-07-29T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/sh-2024-0022<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>The paper is devoted to the problem of describing reality in the language of mathematics and logic in connection with intellectual intuition. The question raised is how the basic requirements of mathematical theory and logic will change if some of the multiverse models of modern physics are taken as the basis. Mathematics is considered in the context of various historical approaches. It is shown that some of the well-known requirements of a formal theory (such as consistency) may begin to play a different role if the multiverse hypothesis is accepted. In the framework of theories based on the idea of multiple worlds, the logical consequence, the natural law of Duns Scotus, the law of excluded middle, and other well-known facts of classical logic which in some cases cause controversy due to their intuitive unacceptability are resolved. The paper discusses an approach based on paraconsistent logics: such logics can be considered the first to correspond to multiverse theories.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/sh-2024-00222024-07-29T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/sh-2024-0018<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>This article explores the domain of legal analysis and its methodologies, emphasising the significance of generalisation in legal systems. It discusses the process of generalisation in relation to legal concepts and the development of ideal concepts that form the foundation of law. The article examines the role of logical induction and its similarities with semantic generalisation, highlighting their importance in legal decision-making. It also critiques the formal-deductive approach in legal practice and advocates for more adaptable models, incorporating fuzzy logic, non-monotonic defeasible reasoning, and artificial intelligence. The potential application of neural networks, specifically deep learning algorithms, in legal theory is also discussed. The article discusses how neural networks encode legal knowledge in their synaptic connections, while the syllogistic model condenses legal information into axioms. The article also highlights how neural networks assimilate novel experiences and exhibit evolutionary progression, unlike the deductive model of law. Additionally, the article examines the historical and theoretical foundations of jurisprudence that align with the basic principles of neural networks. It delves into the statistical analysis of legal phenomena and theories that view legal development as an evolutionary process. The article then explores Friedrich Hayek’s theory of law as an autonomous self-organising system and its compatibility with neural network models. It concludes by discussing the implications of Hayek’s theory on the role of a lawyer and the precision of neural networks.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/sh-2024-00182024-04-28T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/sh-2024-0019<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>This interview features Andrea Reichenberger. Currently she holds a substitute professorship for history of technology at TUM Technical University of Munich. She is junior research group leader at the Department of Mathematics, University of Siegen, Germany, and leads the research project “Rethinking the History of Mathematics and Physics: Women in Focus.” Reichenberger has held several postdoctoral positions, e.g., at the Center for the History of Women Philosophers and Scientists (HWPS) at Paderborn University (Germany) and in the DFG research project “Thought Experiment, Metaphor, Model” at the Institute for Philosophy I at the Ruhr University Bochum. Between 2019 and 2021, she was a fellow at the University of Paderborn and principal investigator of the research project “Foundational research in mathematical logic – relativity – quantum physics. Case studies on the integration of women philosophers.” Reichenberger has written a book on Émilie du Châtelet (Springer, 2016) and has published many articles in journals, collected editions, and encyclopedias.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/sh-2024-00192024-04-28T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/sh-2024-0014<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>This special issue on Logic and Law consists of four research papers and one interview focusing on epistemological reflections on relationships between logic and law, whether in a reductionist or complementary approach. Logic aims to elucidate through formal frameworks, yet it often grapples with the intricate nuances of everyday legal discourse. While law endeavors to delineate permissible conduct within defined jurisdictions, it often encounters challenges stemming from the ambiguity of terms, leading to frequent judicial interpretations and the perception that proliferating exceptions undermines the efficacy of the rule itself.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/sh-2024-00142024-04-28T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/sh-2024-0015<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>Classical logic is based on an underlying view of the world, according to which there are elementary facts and compound facts, which are logical combinations of these elementary facts. Sentences are true if they correspond to, in last instance, the elementary facts in the world. This world view has no place for rules, which exist as individuals in the world, and which create relations between the most elementary facts. As a result, classical logic is not suitable to deal with rules, and is therefore unsuitable to deal with legal reasoning. A logic that is more suitable should take into account that law is a part of social reality, in particular a part that consists of constructivist facts, and that rules play a central role in law. This article gives a superficial description of how social reality exists and of the place of law and legal rules in it. It uses this description to argue that traditional techniques to reason with and about legal rules provide a better logic for law than classical logic. These techniques can be accommodated in a logic that treats rules as logical individuals.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/sh-2024-00152024-04-28T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/sh-2024-0016<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>This paper investigates the basis arguments of so-called legal logic and their relation to logic in its standard meaning. There is no doubt that legal arguments belong to logic in the wide sense (<italic>sensu largo</italic>), but their reduction to schemes of formal logic (<italic>logica sensu stricto</italic>) is a controversial issue. It can be demonstrated that only some legal arguments fall under explicit rules of formal logic, that is, having a deductive character. Most such reasoning is fallible, and its correctness depends on appealing to extra-logical principles taken from legal norms. For instance, if we say, “If it is permitted more, then it is permitted less” (<italic>argumentum a maiori ad minus</italic>), we assume that the concepts expressed by the words “more” and “less” are already defined.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/sh-2024-00162024-04-28T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/sh-2024-0009<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>In this paper, I analyze the shift in Twardowski’s views between his early psychologistic theory of logic and his later anti-psychologistic theory. In particular, I point out that the interpretation suggesting that this change merely involves Twardowski enriching his ontology with products encounters a certain problem in light of his earlier views. To present this problem more precisely, I discuss the foundations of Twardowski’s theory of products, focusing on aspects relevant to the issue of psychologism. Based on this, I reconstruct Twardowski’s theory of logic and highlight where he identified the fallacy of psychologism. I contrast this reconstructed theory with Twardowski’s earlier views at key points and demonstrate that the difference between his early psychologistic theory and his later anti-psychologistic theory is a matter of a shift in emphasis rather than a significant change in the theoretical system itself, and that Twardowski himself understood it as such.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/sh-2024-00092024-04-28T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/sh-2024-0010<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>This interview was given in 2008 by Arkady Zakrevsky (1928–2014), Corresponding Member of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus (1972), Doctor of Technical Sciences (1967), and Professor (1969). He stood at the origins of the birth of cybernetics in the Soviet Union. He proposed the programming language for logical tasks LYaPAS, on the basis of which a series of computer-aided design systems for discrete devices was created, and methods for implementing parallel algorithms for the logical control of interacting processes. Some monographs: <italic>LYaPAS: A Programming Language for Logic and Coding Algorithms</italic> (N.-Y., L.: Academic Press, 1969; with M. A. Gavrilov); <italic>Boolesche Gleichungen: Theorie, Anwendung, Algorithmen</italic> (Berlin: VEB Verlag Technik, 1984; with Dieter Bochmann and Christian Posthoff); <italic>Combinatorial Algorithms of Discrete Mathematics</italic> (Tallinn: TUT Press, 2008; with Yu. Pottosin, L. Cheremisinova); <italic>Optimization in Boolean Space</italic> (Tallinn: TUT Press, 2009; with Yu. Pottosin, L. Cheremisinova); <italic>Design of Logical Control Devices</italic> (Tallinn: TUT Press, 2009; with Yu. Pottosin, L. Cheremisinova); <italic>Combinatorial Calculations in Many-Dimensional Boolean Space</italic> (Tallinn: TUT Press, 2012); <italic>Solving Large Systems Logical Equations</italic> (Tallinn: TUT Press, 2013).</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/sh-2024-00102024-04-28T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/sh-2024-0011<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>This interview was given by Yaroslav Shramko (b. 1963), professor of the Department of Philosophy and rector of the Kryvyi Rih State Pedagogical University (Ukraine). His main research interests lie in the fields of logic and analytical philosophy. He has carried out several projects on modern non-classical logic: 1996–1998, within the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation Fellowship at Humboldt University in Berlin (Germany); 1999–2000, within the Fulbright Program at Indiana University in Bloomington (USA); and 2003–2004, as a Wilhelm Bessel Awardee at Dresden University of Technology (Germany), among others. He has been a frequent invited speaker at international conferences and congresses. He is a member of the editorial boards of several international logic journals, such as <italic>Logic and Logical Philosophy</italic> (Torun, Poland), <italic>Bulletin of the Section of Logic</italic> (Łódź, Poland), <italic>European Journal of Mathematics</italic> (Springer), and <italic>Studia Logica</italic> (Springer). Prof Shramko is the author of “Truth and falsehood: An inquiry into generalized logical values” (Springer, 2011, joint work with Heinrich Wansing) and a number of articles on logic and analytic philosophy in peer-reviewed international journals.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/sh-2024-00112024-04-28T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/sh-2024-0012<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>The interview given by Marina F. Bykova, Professor of Philosophy at the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies at North Carolina State University (USA), and the Editor-in-Chief of the journal <italic>Studies in East European Thought</italic>. She earned her PhD and Dr. Habil in Philosophy from the Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow, Russia), where she worked until relocating to the USA in 2000. Bykova specializes in the history of nineteenth century continental philosophy, with a particular focus on German idealism. She has also written extensively on Russian philosophy and intellectual tradition. She has published 11 books and over 250 scholarly articles. Her forthcoming book, <italic>Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature: A Critical Guide</italic>, is set to be released by Cambridge University Press in 2024.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/sh-2024-00122024-04-28T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/sh-2024-0003<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>The Warsaw School of Logic (WSL) was the famous branch of the Lviv-Warsaw School (LWS) – the most important movement in the history of Polish philosophy. Logic made the most important field in the activities of the WSL. The aim of this work is to highlight the role and significance of the WSL in the history of logic in the 20^th century.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/sh-2024-00032024-04-28T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/sh-2024-0002<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>In this paper, we want to present the genesis of Stanisław Leśniewski’s mereology. Although ‘mereology’ comes from theword ‘part’, mereology arose as a theory of collective classes. That is why we present the differences between the concepts of <italic>being a distributive class</italic> and <italic>being a collective class</italic>. Next, we present Leśniewski’s original mereology from 1927, but with a modern approach. Leśniewski was inspired to create his concept of classes and their elements by Russell’s antinomy. To face it, Leśniewski had to define the concept of <italic>being an element of</italic> based on the concept of <italic>being part of</italic>. Leśniewski showed that in his theory, there is no equivalent to Russell’s antinomy. We will show that his solution has nothing to do with the original approach because, in both cases, we are talking about objects of a different kind. Russell’s original antinomy concerned distributive classes, and Leśsniewski’s considerations concerned collective classes.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/sh-2024-00022024-04-28T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/sh-2024-0006<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>As shown in (Łukowski, 2013), the paradox of the stone is a failed attempt to show that “omnipotence” is a contradictory concept. An element of the argument presented there is that God, while unable to lift the stone, can nevertheless annihilate it. This work considers the amplification of the paradox of the stone to the form generated by the question: can God create a stone which He will not be able to lift, nor, once created, will He be able to destroy.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/sh-2024-00062024-04-28T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/sh-2024-0013ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/sh-2024-00132024-04-28T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/sh-2024-0005<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>This paper briefly discusses the relations between logic and metalogic in history. Metalogic is understood as a reflection on logic in its various senses, particularly <italic>sensu stricto</italic> (formal, mathematical) and <italic>sensu largo</italic> (formal logic plus semantic plus methodology of science). It is shown that metalogic in its contemporary understanding arose after mathematical logic had become a mature discipline. Special passage is devoted to metalogic in Poland. The last part of the paper discussed so-called logocentric predicament.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/sh-2024-00052024-04-28T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/sh-2024-0017<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>The concept of legal gap is tackled from a number of logical perspectives and semantic methods. After presenting our own goal (Section 1), a first introduction into legal logic refers to Bobbio’s works and his formalization of legal statements (Sections 2 and 3). Then Woleński’s contribution to the area is taken into account through his reference to the distinction between two juridical systems (viz. Common Law vs Civil Law) and the notion of conditional norms (Section 4). The notion of reason is also highlighted in the case of Raz’s legal logic, thereby leading to a future connection with von Wright’s logic of truth and an analogy made with an anti-realist reading of truth-values and norms (Section 5). Our personal contribution is introduced through a reflection on how logic should deal with the logical form of norms (Section 6), before entering a number of crucial definitions and distinctions for the concepts of norm, legal statement, and promulgation (Section 7). The final point is a proposed semantics for legal statements, which is both many-valued and gap-friendly (Section 8). A distinction between a number of requirements for permission and forbiddance leads to a set of non-classical juridical systems in which non-permission and forbiddance are not equivalent with each other any more; this does justice to Woleński’s former distinction between Common Law and Civil Law, also leading ultimately to a non-classical square of legal oppositions in which several legal operators may collapse into other ones (Section 9).</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/sh-2024-00172024-04-28T00:00:00.000+00:00https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/sh-2024-0007<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>Context is essential in virtually all human activities. Yet some logical notions seem to be context-free. For example, the nature of the universal quantifier, the very meaning of “all”, seems to be independent of the context. At the same time, there are many quantifier expressions, and some are context-independent, while others are not. Similarly, purely logical consequence seems to be context-independent. Yet often we encounter strong inferences, good enough for practical purposes, but not valid. The two types of examples suggest a general problem: how to characterise the context-free logical concepts in their natural environment, that is, in the field of their context-dependent associates. A general Thesis on Quantifiers is formulated: among all quantifiers, the context-free ones are just those definable by the universal quantifier. The issue of inferences is treated following the approach introduced by Richard L. Epstein: valid ones are an extreme case, the result of the disappearance of context-dependence. This idea can be applied to an analysis of a form of abduction, called “reductive inference” in Polish literature on logic. A tentative Thesis on Inferences identifies the validity of a strong inference that is context-independent.</p> </abstract>ARTICLEtruehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/sh-2024-00072024-04-28T00:00:00.000+00:00en-us-1