rss_2.0Philosophy FeedSciendo RSS Feed for Philosophy Feed Defence of Discrete Plural Logic (or How to Avoid Logical Overmedication When Dealing with Internally Singularized Pluralities)<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>In recent decades, plural logic has established itself as a well-respected member of the extensions of first-order classical logic. In the present paper, I draw attention to the fact that among the examples that are commonly given in order to motivate the need for this new logical system, there are some in which the elements of the plurality in question are internally singularized (e.g. ‘Whitehead and Russell wrote <italic>Principia Mathematica</italic>’), while in others they are not (e.g. ‘Some philosophers wrote <italic>Principia Mathematica</italic>’). Then, building on previous work, I point to a subsystem of plural logic in which inferences concerning examples of the first type can be adequately dealt with. I notice that such a subsystem (here called ‘discrete plural logic’) is in reality a mere variant of first-order logic as standardly formulated, and highlight the fact that it is axiomatizable while full plural logic is not. Finally, I urge that greater attention be paid to discrete plural logic and that discrete plurals are not used in order to motivate the introduction of full-fledged plural logic—or, at least, not without remarking that they can also be adequately dealt with in a considerably simpler system.</p> </abstract>ARTICLE2022-08-29T00:00:00.000+00:00Higher-Order Skolem’s Paradoxes and the Practice of Mathematics: a Note<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>We will formulate some analogous higher-order versions of Skolem’s paradox and assess the generalizability of two solutions for Skolem’s paradox to these paradoxes: the textbook approach and that of Bays (2000). We argue that the textbook approach to handle Skolem’s paradox cannot be generalized to solve the parallel higher-order paradoxes, unless it is augmented by the claim that there is no unique language within which the practice of mathematics can be formalized. Then, we argue that Bays’ solution to the original Skolem’s paradox, unlike the textbook solution, can be generalized to solve the higher-order paradoxes without any implication about the possibility or order of a language in which mathematical practice is to be formalized.</p> </abstract>ARTICLE2022-08-29T00:00:00.000+00:00Necessarily the Old Riddle Necessary Connections and the Problem of Induction<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>In this paper, I will discuss accounts to solve the problem of induction by introducing necessary connections. The basic idea is this: if we know that there are necessary connections between properties <italic>F</italic> and <italic>G</italic> such that <italic>F</italic> -ness necessarily brings about <italic>G</italic>-ness, then we are justified to infer that all, including future or unobserved, <italic>F</italic> s will be <italic>G</italic>s. To solve the problem of induction with ontology has been proposed by David Armstrong and Brian Ellis. In this paper, I will argue that these attempts to solve the problem of induction fail. Necessary connections fail to reliably imply the respective regularities for two main reasons: Firstly, according to an argument originally presented by Helen Beebee, the respective necessary connections might be time-limited, and hence do not warrant inferences about future cases. As I will discuss, arguments against the possibility or explanatory power of time-limited necessary connections fail. Secondly, even time-unlimited necessary connections do not entail strict or non-strict regularities, and nor do they allow inferences about individual cases, which is an important function of inductive reasoning. Moreover, the proposed solution to the problem of induction would only apply to a tiny minority of inductive inferences. I argue that most inductive inferences are not easily reducible to the proposed inference pattern, as the vast majority of everyday inductive inferences do not involve necessary connections between fundamental physical properties or essences.</p> </abstract>ARTICLE2022-08-29T00:00:00.000+00:00Three Arguments against Constitutive Norm Accounts of Assertion<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>In this article I introduce constitutive norm accounts of assertion, and then give three arguments for giving up on the constitutive norm project. First I begin with an updated version of MacFarlane’s Boogling argument. My second argument is that the ‘overriding response’ that constitutive norm theorists offer to putative counterexamples is unpersuasive and dialectically risky. Third and finally, I suggest that constitutive norm theorists, in appealing to the analogy of games, actually undermine their case that they can make sense of assertions that fail to follow their putative constitutive norm. These considerations, I suggest, together show that the constitutive norm project founders not because any single norm is not descriptively correct of our assertion practices, but rather, because giving a constitutive norm as the definition of assertion alone is insufficient.</p> </abstract>ARTICLE2022-08-29T00:00:00.000+00:00No : Why Theistic Evolution Fails configurations of Symbolist Poetry under the Sphere of the Than-atotic Imaginary Giants of Reason. Aspects of Liberal Theology on Christianity Use of Japanese Calligraphy when Promoting Japanese Traditional Products – the Digital Age Glyphe Evolution of the Religious Discourse in the Pages of the Journal from Sibiu between the years 1944-1949 the new truth and the fake news phenomenon competence in media during the pandemic – interlanguage aspects and Knowledge Reality of Violence and the Violence of Reality in Mario Vargas Llosa’s Novels Acts And Secular In The History And The Sociology Of Religion: Comparing Eliade And Weber Ethics – Levinas War in Ukraine and a Real Evil Prospects of Libertarian Punishment Theory: Rejoinder to Blasco and Marcos<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>Libertarian punishment theory was initially articulated by Murray N. Rothbard and Walter E. Block. It was broken down into four separate stages. To a great degree, this theory was accepted by Eduardo Blasco and Davie Marcos. However, they maintain it is in need of some slight adjustments and improvements, mainly dealing with the interest rate. The present paper claims their suggestion while valid, is unnecessary, since this theory already incorporates that element, at least implicitly.</p> </abstract>ARTICLE2022-07-09T00:00:00.000+00:00Predicting the Consequences of Perceived Data Privacy Risks on Consumer Behaviour: An Entropy-TOPSIS Approach<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>Advancement in internet of things (IoT) and proliferation in the use of smart devices have raised concerns about the data privacy of online users. This study predicts the consequences of perceived data privacy risks on consumer behaviours in Lagos State, Nigeria using the integrated Entropy-Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS). We employed Entropy to assign weights to each criterion. Subsequently, responses were systematically ranked to arrive at an inference using TOPSIS. 84.8% agree that any perceived cyber security threat or a breach in their data privacy would stop them from proceeding with the transaction or activity online, or the use of a digital product. Similarly, (86.7%), agree it is critical that online businesses only ask for customer information that is relevant to the use of the product or service. Thus, the findings indicate that the privacy paradox of enlightened online consumers tends to diminish when they are faced with perceived data privacy and cybersecurity risks.</p> </abstract>ARTICLE2022-07-09T00:00:00.000+00:00en-us-1