The Semiotic Background of the Ineffective Investigation in the Weird Detective Story

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Abstract. The classical detective story is based on a teleological certainty offered by the narrative. In these stories, the detective successfully solves the crime, and the lawful order is restored in an assuring manner, so the closure of the narrative structure does not allow for an open ending in ontological terms. However, weird fiction and its most recent form, new weird, have a different approach to the teleological givens prescribed by the classical detective story (whodunit). The weird investigation is paradigmatically open-ended, and the detective most often fails to solve the case. The argument develops a distinction between two basic semiotic structures that characterize crime fiction. While all crime fiction is set in an environment that is based on simulation, the classical detective can revert the simulated semiotic structure into signs based on representation, thus the interpretation of the signs results in solving the crime. The weird and new weird stories, on the other hand, defy this representational logic, which is demonstrated by Howard Phillips Lovecraft’s weird fiction and Neil Gaiman’s new weird short story entitled “A Study in Emerald.”

Keywords: crime fiction, simulation, semiotics, weird tale, new weird.

Detective stories abound in various types of investigators who set out to solve a criminal case to reinstate the lawful order disturbed by the crime itself. The work of the detective is the prerequisite of regaining the social or legal stability that is threatened by criminal acts. Whether the detective is a hyper-masculine hard-boiled one, a stereotypical spinster or a more gender-fluid police detective, the aim of the investigation is to re-establish the ontological certainty by epistemological means. Thus, detective stories have a teleological burden on the protagonists who are bound to restore law and find the answers for the mystery. The classical position of the detective is laden with the need of an epistemological assurance that attempts to find and rearrange the threads leading to a crime. However, there is a variety of subgenres that defy this logic. The paper argues that weird
fiction, a subgenre of speculative fiction probably most known for Lovecraft’s “weird tale,” and its early twenty-first century revival under the umbrella term of “new weird” frequently employ the detective figure to draw attention to the fact that not all mysteries can be solved, that sometimes the attempts to recreate order is doomed because of the information revealed by the investigation. The “weird detective” moves around in a fictional world filled with monsters, aliens, werewolves, vampires, and other supernatural creatures whose existence and actions defy Cartesian logic, thus any investigation based on the human version of ontology and epistemology is in vain and results in existential nihilism. The paper examines the trope of the ineffective detective figure in Howard Phillips Lovecraft’s weird fiction and Neil Gaiman’s new weird short story, “A Study in Emerald,” and contends that this figure inevitably goes against the difference between the semiotic systems of representation and simulation.

The Detective Story and Simulation

The crime scene is a compulsory asset of the classical detective story. The sleuth arrives at the scene, gathers information through the narrative, analyses the clues and comes to a conclusion that finally results in solving the case via “the process of interpretation itself,” which is a key component of all crime fiction according to John Scaggs (2005, 4). In semiotic terms, the detective’s work is the interpretation of the available signifiers, and the original lawful and ontological order can be reconstructed after successfully finding, examining, and decoding the clues. However, when facing the case for the first time, the investigator only has an array of signs that are based on various models used by the criminal. These models include all the necessary elements of the crime such as motive, technical means of committing the unlawful act, and the possible attempts to mask the clues. In other words, what is taken to be real for the detective is a pre-manufactured array of signs that are based on and generated by an earlier action that needs to be investigated. Thus, the crime scene consists of signs that need to be decoded in order to find the underlying meaning, which is, in an ideal case, the solution to the enigma. However, when the crime scene is first encountered by the detective, this premade set of conditions “is produced from miniaturised units, from matrices, memory banks and command models – and with these it can be reproduced an indefinite number of times” (Baudrillard 1988, 167). The small units of the various clues building up the matrix of the crime and the statements of the witnesses serve as command models for the detective, thus the post-crime reality is constituted by pre-existing models for all the characters of the story including the sleuth, the minor characters, and the witnesses. Solving the case aims at eliminating such instances in the future so that the models
behind the crime would never again generate a similar event. The detective is aware of the fact that the reality of the case “no longer has to be rational, since it is no longer measured against some ideal or negative instance. It is nothing more than operational” (Baudrillard 1988, 167). It is the irrationality of the crime that excludes the ideal of normality, which serves as a counterpoint to the crime. However, the crime is already finished by the time the detective reaches the scene, and the criminal conduct is measured by the means it operated or by the way it was committed resulting in the obvious signs to be investigated. In crime fiction, the harsh reality of the unnatural, “unimaginable” occurrence of crime in the natural normalcy within the boundaries of the fictional ontology of the text renders the crime not belonging to the realm of the “real at all. It is a hyperreal, the product of an irradiating synthesis of combinatory models in a hyperspace without atmosphere” (Baudrillard 1988, 167). As all the clues found at the scene are based on models that are results of the previous action of the culprit, the crime scene turns to be a hyperreal set of signs that lack the surrounding context or atmosphere in which these very signs make sense.

The hyperreal signs of the crime scene are governed by the signification process of simulation that turns reality into hyperreality, a model-based reality which is prefabricated by the criminal and perceived by the sleuth. Therefore, the reality of the crime is replaced by the hyperreality of the criminal act, in which the signs (clues) can only be decoded by the extraordinary knowledge or talent of the investigator. Two different semiotic systems clash in the case of the crime scene: first, representation, in which signifiers can be interpreted, resulting in signified or referents, and, second, simulation that consists of simulacra, i.e. self-referential signs.

So it is with simulation, insofar as it is opposed to representation. Representation starts from the principle that the sign and the real are equivalent (even if this equivalence is Utopian, it is a fundamental axiom). Conversely, simulation starts from the Utopia of this principle of equivalence, from the radical negation of the sign as value, from the sign as reversion and death sentence of every reference. Whereas representation tries to absorb simulation by interpreting it as false representation, simulation envelops the whole edifice of representation as itself a simulacrum. (Baudrillard 1988, 170)

As representation stands for the finished decoding process of the successful detective’s work, simulation evokes the ongoing progress of investigation or an impossible case, a perfect crime that cannot be resolved. The classical detective of the whodunit has the capacity of finding the right interpretations of the clues so that the self-referential simulacrum, the simulated and imploded sign compressing
the signified and the referent can be decoded into the Saussurean sign based on the arbitrariness of equivalence between the signifier and its meaning.

In Arthur Conan Doyle’s novel, *A Study in Scarlet*, the crime scene is a reality that Sherlock Holmes needs to take for granted, while the crime scene is full of signs that cannot be interpreted without finding the underlying models, for example, the motive, spatial characteristics, or the way the murder was committed. Consequently, the simulated hyperreal setting, for example, the crime scene itself has to be decoded via the means of representation in order to find the models that will finally result in the solution to the case.

Models no longer constitute an imaginary domain with reference to the real; they are, themselves, an apprehension of the real, and thus leave no room for any fictional extrapolation – they are immanent, and therefore leave no room for any kind of transcendentalism. The stage is now set for simulation, in the cybernetic sense of the word – that is to say, for all kinds of manipulation of these models (hypothetical scenarios, the creation of simulated situations, etc.), but now nothing distinguishes this management-manipulation from the real itself. (Baudrillard 1991, 310)

The detective’s work is to turn simulation back into representation so that the self-referential, imploded sign of the simulacrum can be reverted into the signifier/signified binary pair that will churn out the solution to the crime. The simulacrum short-circuits the extreme poles of the signifier and the signified, and “this confusion of the fact with its model [...] is what each time allows for all the possible interpretations, even the most contradictory” (Baudrillard 1988, 175). The resulting implosion of the two poles of the sign brings along with itself the collapse of the binary into the self-referential simulacrum that no longer has a double nature based on surface and depth. In Doyle’s *A Study in Scarlet*, the simulacrum of the crime scene that Holmes investigates is a simulated hyperreal that is based on the models set by the murderer, Jefferson. The clues left behind – “Rache” written on the wall in blood, footprints leading to the house in mud, the smell of the corpse – are the results of the models employed and utilized by the murderer. The crime scene is a hyperreal space or territory that has lost its reference, and it is Holmes’s extraordinary talents and system of deduction that can crack the simulated spatial arrangement of the scene.

The simulated nature of the crime scene is an essential generic feature, thus the semiotic core of simulation envelopes practically all the various forms of crime fiction, e.g. the whodunit, hard-boiled detective fiction, police procedural, etc. As the investigation aims at the interpretation of the simulacra, the entire investigative process is based on finding the pre-existing models of the crime and reconstructing the missing story. In the traditional detective narrative, the explanation of the
crime is an essential component, thus the clues can be successfully interpreted and traced back to find a solution to the case. However, this process is based on the binary semiotic logic of representation, which is in stark contrast to the simulated crime scene. “Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being or a substance. It is the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal” (Baudrillard 1988, 166). The deeds of the criminal constitute a range of models that build up the enigma of the crime itself. This enigma is rooted in hyperreality because the models are hidden for the spectator, and they remain undisclosed in unresolved cases. The sleuth faces the hyperreal in the form of the simulated crime scene and needs to transform the simulacrum back into the binary logic of representation to gain a profound insight into the ontological background of the crime, where the signifiers and the signified can be clearly distinguished.

The simulacrum dissolves the binary of representation in both the diegetic and mimetic senses, as it liquefies the boundaries between the sign (signifier) and its referent (signified). As a result, the simulacrum takes over reality, and thus simulation becomes the prevalent mode of signification, while representation is reduced into a special subcategory of simulation (Baudrillard 1988, 170). The comparison of the classical and weird detective’s possibilities to interpret the case and find a solution reveals the difference between the basic semiotic strategies underlying the classic and weird detective story. In the whodunit, clues constitute the semiotic basis of solving the puzzle by locating the meaning of the signifiers. Holmes’s special interpretation skills enable him to arrive at a solution that is inaccessible to the institutionalized police – in Holmes’s ironic words, “Gregson, Lestrade and Co.” – or the general reading public. The second chapter of A Study in Scarlet, entitled “Science of Deduction”, clearly indicates that Holmes is fully aware of how signification endows the sign with a referent and how interpretation can decode the sign so that the signified or the meaning can be isolated: “By a man’s finger nails, by his coat-sleeve, by his boot, by his trouser knees, by the callosities of his forefinger and thumb, by his expression, by his shirt cuffs – by each of these things a man’s calling is plainly revealed” (Doyle 2012, 737). Through the interpretation of these model-based signs generated by the criminal, Holmes moves along a logical sequence to arrive at the solution, so the simulated signs of the murder (clues, artefacts, setting, murder scene, the nature of the murder, etc.) can be interpreted, resulting in a logical solution that provides an undisputed and closed reading of the events. This is possible because, as David Geherin argues, “the classical whodunit is predicated upon a benevolent and knowable universe that the sleuth is confident can be forced to surrender a solution to any mystery if one diligently applies the laws of logic” (Geherin 2020, 161). By the extraordinary ability of the detective, the crime scene’s hyperreality consisting of simulacra can be reverted to the status of the Saussurean sign where the signifier (clue) and the signified (evidence) can be differentiated and the meaning identified.
Investigation in Weird and New Weird Fiction

The necessity of turning the simulated semiotics of the hyperreal back into representation lies at the heart of the classic detective story. Tanja Välisalo et al. argue that “the crime genre and its settings are typically realistic – or mimetic – and the genre is often teleologically oriented, focusing on crime, investigation and resolution” (Välisalo et al. 2020, 401). This way “all the mysteries will be explained, all the problems solved, and peace and order will return,” concludes Phyllis Dorothy James, the author of the Adam Dalgliesh mystery series, in her non-fiction book entitled *Talking about Detective Fiction* (2009, 75). Jesper Gulddal adds that the mystery is revealed by finding a solution to the crime, thus the narrative closure demonstrates that the pieces of the puzzle will finally fall into place in a final, exclusive, logical, and coherent picture sorting out any other interpretive possibilities (Gulddal 2020). To prove this encompassing semiotic practice of the genre, Gulddal employs the metaphor of the maze and likens the chain of clues to Ariadne’s thread that enables the teleological operation of the narrative. The teleological revelation at the end of the narrative brings forth the explanation of the textual enigma by means of the interpretation of the signs: “The clue in classic detective fiction epitomises the mystery aspect of the plot while at the same time underwriting the genre’s claim that the world is an orderly place that can be read and understood in much the same way as a book” (Gulddal 2020, 199). However, as Martin Edwards remarks, even the Golden Age detective novel was a satiric reaction to the all-knowing sleuth (Edwards 2020, 186). This indicates a turning away from the representation scheme that can crack simulation, because in a need of a renewal, the entire genre sought new ways of realigning the classic set-up of the early twentieth-century history of detective fiction (Zsámbara 2021). It seems that when Umberto Eco shifts the semiotic decoding of the sign-function to a “matter of interference,” i.e. the matrix of signifiers that have to be explored in order to churn out the semiotic essence of crime fiction (Eco 1976, 224), the referential givens of the classic whodunit themselves are questioned and shifted toward a semiotic structure based on simulation.

The tendency of moving away from representation towards simulation in the semiotics of classic detective fiction is most clearly exemplified by Howard Phillips Lovecraft’s weird tale. Although Edgar Allan Poe had an apparent influence on Lovecraft, the Lovecraftian weird tale, especially the stories building up the Cthulhu mythos, counts as the essence of unresolved investigations. Defining the “true weird tale” (Lovecraft 2012, 5), Lovecraft identifies the model of cosmic horror with the invalidity of the laws of nature known and accepted by humans alongside the resulting cognitive chaos. In his volume of essays entitled *Supernatural Horror in Literature*, Lovecraft names the fear of the unknown as “the oldest and strongest emotion of mankind” (Lovecraft 2012, 3). The concept
of reality produced by environmental influences is the basis of human cognition, the fear of the unknowable and the supernatural, which makes the very idea of reality ambiguous (Cisco 2022), is a breeding ground for religion and superstition, fuelled by “an inexplicable dread of outer, unknown forces” (Lovecraft 2012, 5). In Lovecraft’s prose, the recurring distortion of the subject’s identity due to the religious or superstitious cults is linked to a shift in the social relations of society (Ralickas 2007, 371), based on the destruction of rationality, the total annihilation of logical frameworks: “a malign and particular suspension or defeat of those fixed laws of Nature which are our only safeguard against the assaults of chaos and the daemons of unplumbed space” (Lovecraft 2012, 5). Lovecraft’s weird fiction shatters the foundation of the human existentialist approach to make sense of the world, as the human science-based epistemological means that govern the concept of the universe cannot be utilized to interpret and understand the supernatural ontology of demiurgic alien creatures.

After the publication of Lovecraft’s stories, the Cthulhu mythos has significantly mutated to become one of the most prolific bestiaries of cosmic horror in popular culture. In this endless rewriting of the myth, which continues today in a variety of media forms, the claustrophobic, suffocating nature of Lovecraft’s most successful stories and the recurring element of the texts, the nightmare, play a crucial role: “The repetition and inevitable fatality of the story is strangely alive and well in the work of Derleth and others, and indeed the ‘Lovecraftian strategy’ [...] persists to this day, and the Cthulhu myth continues to sprawl across the body of Gothic like a diseased but fascinating tumour” (Punter and Byron 2004, 144). The enduring popularity of the creatures of fictional myth may be rooted, among other things, in the fact that godlike aliens rewrite the scientific and rational conception of the universe and confront it with a power that is in fact completely indifferent to the earthly scale. The aliens of the Cthulhu mythos derive their power from the fact that they populate the universe as beings beyond all earthly measure – and beyond the countless monsters of science fiction history –, who typically resist all human-scale concepts and reduce human power to zero. One of the basic premises of Lovecraft’s cosmic horror is that the Earth’s civilization is at the mercy of a parallel, incomprehensibly powerful force in a shared universe and that this ultimately drives humans mad. Madness, in the Lovecraftian metaphysical scheme, is the only logical and meaningful response to the horrendous and horrific experience of existence (Goho 2009, 12).

The semiotic model of simulation in weird fiction relies on existentialist nihilism and philosophical pessimism. Pessimism has shaped the development of philosophy through a wide range of literary works throughout its parallel and contemporaneous history with philosophy (Sexton 2019, 90), which has unfolded in a wide range of philosophical and artistic disciplines from Heraclitus to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Arthur Schopenhauer, Søren Kierkegaard, Friedrich Nietzsche,
and Albert Camus. Existential nihilism centres around the themes of the absurdity of existence, the incompatibility of freedom and happiness, the lack of control over human life, and the anxiety caused by the inability to believe in meaning and intelligibility. Similarly, the motto of *The Call of Cthulhu* also draws attention to the hopelessness and insignificance of the human race and, using this as a generating model, considers the following thematic pattern as its foundation:

Of such great powers or beings there may be conceivably a survival... a survival of a hugely remote period when... consciousness was manifested, perhaps, in shapes and forms long since withdrawn before the tide of advancing humanity... forms of which poetry and legend alone have caught a flying memory and called them gods, monsters, mythical beings of all sorts and kinds... (Lovecraft 2008, 355; ellipsis in the original)

The quote comes from the publicist, novelist, and short story writer Algernon Blackwood, one of the leading authors of weird fiction in the first half of the twentieth century. Blackwood consciously used the thematic and stylistic models and patterns as a governing method in his adapted stories, and he also made his mark in weird fiction, the dominant sub-genre of speculative fiction of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Blackwood’s texts redefined the genre’s obligatory element, supernatural horror, which is probably best epitomized by the mysterious entities in his novella entitled *The Willows*, highly praised by Lovecraft. With the evolution of weird fiction, the main motif of existential fear remained untouched, but the category of the monster underwent a considerable change by the appearance of tentacled creatures, a characteristic feature of the subgenre, in contrast to its more anthropomorphic or typically humanoid counterparts in science fiction and fantasy (Miéville 2009, 510–516). Around the turn of the millennium, the weird is recovered as “new weird” in texts by Ted Chiang, China Miéville, and Jeff VanderMeer, among many others. According to VanderMeer:

New Weird relies for its visionary power on a “surrender to the weird” that isn’t, for example, hermetically sealed in a haunted house on the moors or in a cave in Antarctica. The “surrender” (or “belief”) of the writer can take many forms, some of them even involving the use of postmodern techniques that do not undermine the surface reality of the text. (VanderMeer and VanderMeer 2008, xvi)

New weird echoes the stylistic and generic characteristics of the postmodern through continuous memetic regeneration, borrowing, appropriation, copying, and application (Nyikos 2020, 116), which shows the primary, dominant role of generic models (clichés and patterns), as well as their constant production
and incessant return. Besides fear, anxiety, superhuman presence, and the impossibility of cognition, existential nihilism is one of the most important fundamental models of the Lovecraftian tradition, an indispensable constituent in the survival of the Lovecraftian horror story in a new weird setting.

Weird fiction defies the rules of the classical detective story governed by the representational scheme of a possible and legitimate interpretation of the criminal case. Thomas Heise, drawing on the classic theoretical studies of Howard Haycraft and S. S. Van Dyne, concludes that resolving the criminal case depends on a “purely formal and geometrical” (Heise 2020, 222) structure of logical consequence. “Solving crimes [is] a process of deduction” (Heise 2020, 222), which takes a representational form where signs can be interpreted in a teleological sense. Gulddal adds that the interpretable signs must become “a core value of the genre” and “no clue must be withheld from the reader” (Gulddal 2020, 196) so that the representational process can be clearly observed involving “an ontology in the sense of an understanding of how the world is ordered and how its elements – people, actions, objects – interconnect to form a coherent whole” (Gulddal 2020, 197). Moreover, the possibility of disentangling the threads of the mystery in a clear reading is influenced by the ability to decode the “underlying ‘truth’ of space” (Heise 2020, 223), which can be cognitively mapped and recognized. Weird fiction, and its early twenty-first-century revival, new weird specialize in denying the representational background of the classical detective narrative. Instead, they employ a platform of simulation that fosters existential nihilism deriving from the impossibility of reading. In contrast with the tenets of the classical detective story, the logical decoding of signs and the method of deduction are doomed to fail, as the investigation has to face an insurmountable and incomprehensible non-human power, an “alien blood” (Hefner 2014, 654), which is an “indicator of things that are far worse than murder” (Hefner 2014, 668). As the final, all-encompassing reading of the case is unattainable for the detective, the case remains unsolved, thus the genre of detective fiction needs to be re-evaluated from the vantage point of a simulation-based semiotics.

Neil Gaiman’s Hugo-winning rewriting, or rather, by his own admission, “Lovecraft/Holmes fan fiction” is an amalgam of Doyle’s story and the Lovecraftian weird tale that sets out to redefine the representational scheme of the detective story and turn towards simulation. The intertextual play with *A Study in Scarlet* follows a “long-running tendency within crime writing to acknowledge, either obliquely or directly, its own fictional status,” in which “metatextual play is common in both bestselling and ‘literary’ or experimental examples of the genre” (Bernthal 2020, 227). However, “A Study in Emerald” only loosely evokes the Doyle text, and the finished investigation of *A Study in Scarlet* turns out to be an unfinished one in Gaiman’s story. The intertextual connection between the two texts is built on the difference between Holmes’s supreme deductive skills based
on representation and the simulated setting of the unsuccessful investigation in “A Study in Emerald.” From the beginning, Gaiman’s story navigates in a metatextuality in which the story “self-referentially call[s] attention to the detectives’ own positions as protagonists in detective fiction series, undermining the effect they desire” (Effron 2010, 155). This desired effect in “A Study in Emerald” can be identified with successful investigation, as it is based on the literary heritage of the unerring Holmes figure, but Gaiman’s story exchanges the readable and interpretable case for an unsolvable one. The changes in the storyline, characters, and setting are due to the different semiotic approaches the two texts employ. “A Study in Emerald” is told by an unnamed narrator evoking Watson’s narrative function in Doyle’s novel. The new roommates set out to a crime scene resembling the one in A Study in Scarlet, but the word “Rache” is written on the wall in green blood. The pipe-smoking detective, frequently referred to as “my friend,” reaches to a halt in the investigation, as it turns out that the killer is a restorationist, who killed the superhuman victim to take revenge for the sufferings the Great Old Ones imposed on humankind in the last seven hundred years since the aliens took control of the planet and rule all of the countries in a form of a monarchical dynasty, including “the Queen of Albion herself, and the Black One of Egypt (in shape almost like a man), followed by the Ancient Goat, Parent to a Thousand, Emperor of all China, and the Czar Unanswerable, and He Who Presides over the New World, and the White Lady of the Antarctic Fastness, and the others” (Gaiman n. y., 6). The killer manages to escape, and the case is not solved, as the detective cannot fight the powerful alien race. Although the culprit escapes, the reader can put together the pieces of information hidden in the narrative, and thus the reading process mirrors the investigation the detective conducts. However, what remains a simulacrum for the detective becomes representation for the reader. The decoding of the identity of the killer is based on information revealed by the narrative, as the narrator makes it clear that the criminal hiding behind the alias “Rache” is aware of the scientific paper the narrator wrote: “I corresponded with you quite profitably two years ago about certain theoretical anomalies in your paper on the Dynamics of an Asteroid” (Gaiman n. y., 8). The Dynamics of an Asteroid is a fictional book that appears in Doyle’s The Valley of Fear written in 1914. In this novel, Holmes refers to this book as the work of his archenemy, Professor James Moriarty. In addition, “A Study in Emerald” ends with the initials of the narrator, from which it can be concluded that the story was most likely composed by Colonel Sebastian Moran, Moriarty’s employee. Although there are minor discrepancies – the narrator signs the letter as “S_ M_ Major (Ret’d)” and The Dynamics of an Asteroid is mentioned as a book and not a paper in The Valley of Fear – between Doyle’s fictional universe and Gaiman’s story, it seems that the alien-killer culprit “Rache” is Holmes himself. However, the killer manages to escape,
and the investigation does not reach its goal on the diegetic level. Thus, the unfinished search for the culprit has to be ended by those informed readers who are knowledgeable of Doyle’s works.

The relocation of Doyle’s *A Study in Scarlet* into a weird setting is based on the very notion of the impossibility of interpretation and reading, which defies the rules set by classic detective fiction. In “A Study in Emerald,” decoding the clues is impossible for the investigator, as representation enabling the division of the Saussurean sign into signifier and signified does not function. It is impossible to solve the criminal case because the underlying semiotic system of signification is governed by the logic of simulation resulting in a hyperreal setting and self-referential simulacra. The investigation can only be partially concluded on a metadiegetic level by considering the intertextual connections between “A Study in Emerald” and Doyle’s Holmes stories. While the “notions of authenticity and believability are cornerstones of the crime genre” (Nilsson 2020, 241), the weird and new weird stories generally employ such supernatural forces that cannot be studied by means of human cognition. The various superhuman creatures in Lovecraft’s weird tales and their new weird rewriting of Gaiman’s cannot be investigated because the detectives lack the proper cognitive apparatus to understand the workings of supernatural monstrosities. The resulting existential nihilism is generated by the impossibility of finding explicable models behind the simulated crime and its irrational weird ontology, which proves for the weird detective that this “world of mystery is, as a rule, a world of darkness, violence and evil” (Gomel 1995, 346).

**Works Cited**


