FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE REPEATED PARTICIPATION 
IN UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS: THE IMPACT 
OF THE 1990 AND 1994 CAMPAIGNS

Author
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Abstract
This paper is the analysis of the repeated participation of the 1990 and 1994 elections candidates in the following 1998–2014 elections. The interest in the long-standing candidates is dictated by the need to better understand which type of political background and political strategy gravitate more to the commencement of a political career at the very beginning of democracy building in Ukraine. The paper hypothesizes that in 1990 having a Communist Nomenklatura background was the determining factor, whereas in 1994, unaffiliated candidates who originated from the “party of power” were the main contenders. The hypotheses are tested using the data on the background and electoral results of the candidates, who started in the 1990 and 1994 electoral campaigns (8,898 candidates in the EAST PaC database). In this study both successful and failed candidates are studied because they all acquire experience of political professional activity. It was found out that the Communist party officials and managers of the state enterprises, who had won in 1990, competed in the following electoral campaigns less often, while unaffiliated directors more often. The affiliation with the left-wing parties in 1994 predicts higher odds that a candidate will repeat his/her attempts to get a seat.¹

Keywords
recruitment of political elites, repeated participation, Nomenklatura, elite reproduction, elite replacement theories

¹ The data used for this paper were collected for the research grant “Who Wins and Who Loses in the Parliamentary Elections? From Formal Theory to Empirical Analysis” (EAST PaC) funded by Poland’s National Science Centre (Sonata Bis decision number 2012/05/E/HS6/03556). The paper has been prepared thanks to the stipend for the Ukrainian scholars at risk of National Academy of Sciences, USA, and Polish Academy of Sciences in the summer of 2022.
Research problem and context of the study

In 2022 Ukraine celebrated 31 years of national Independence and of democratic rule. The Ukrainian electoral history is slightly longer, since the first semi-free elections were held in 1990, when Ukraine was still a Soviet republic. Then, on the wave of Mikhail Gorbachev’s Perestroika, the choice between at least two candidates, one of whom could be aligned with the Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU), was given to the electorate for the first time since in the Soviet Union. People’s Movement of Ukraine – Rukh – was the oppositional force then, and its members successfully participated in the elections under the name of “Democratic bloc” (Bojcun 1995, Kuzio 2000).

At that time the lack of trained professionals, politicians and officials, and of the corresponding social capital, was a common problem for all post-communist states, and especially for those Soviet republics and parts of republics, like Center and East of Ukraine, that spent 70 years in the totalitarian state and lacked their national elite. The only ready-made candidates for rule were the former communist and Soviet state administration officials and the chiefs of industrial plants and Soviet administration, the so-called “red directors”. The latter obtained the skills for managing large state-owned industries that made them an equivalent of the technocratic power in the West. These three groups, known as Communist nomenklatura, formed a social and political capital and enjoyed electoral support, which was practically unequalled by the potential candidates into new, democratic elites that often lack leadership skills and were perceived as alien, especially in the Russified and industrialized East of the country.

In 1994 the situation had changed since the CPSU no longer existed and 33 new political parties stood for elections. Workers’ collectives, social organizations, and collectives of voters were able to run a candidate convened according to their place of residence. In 1994, as it was in 1990, all 450 deputies were elected in a majoritarian system in single member districts, using absolute majority rule. Seventy-two percent of the candidates ran as independents. The independents were also the winners, despite the fact that the election of 1994 had been recognized as the beginning of the multiparty politics (Sadowski and Pohorila 2018). These independent deputies were believed to have originated from the former Nomenklatura members and became a basis for the nonpartisan party of power, who were using their economic and administrative resource in order to defend their economic interests (Bojcun 1995, Haran’ and Maiboroda 2000, Protsyk 2013). “Party of power”, whose role had been strengthened by the new Constitution that gave more power to the President Leonid Kuchma, had been effectively using the new Constitution as an instrument until the Orange Revolution in 2004. Later, many of the “party of power” members “coagulated” into political parties associated with the President – Narodno-Demokratychna, or Hromada, “Za Jedynu Ukrainu” – that ensured them success at the 1998 and 2002 elections in majoritarian component of the mixed electoral system (Rozhkova 2005).

The party politics was represented by the newly created Communist party of Ukraine, and the other left-wing parties – moderately nationalist Socialist, Progressive Socialist and

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2 The power hierarchy of the Soviet Union constituted the protectorate of the local party organizations over local industries. However, some industrial enterprises — machine-building, metallurgical, military and extraction industries — were subordinated directly to the all-Union ministries. The directors of such enterprises were appointed in Moscow, and their influence was much larger than that of local party leaders. Later this elite group received the name of “red directors”.
Rural parties; who altogether earned more than 30% of seats. The rightist party *Rukh* and the so-called centrist parties garnered far fewer of the seats and after the 1994 campaign they vanished or reorganized (Pohorila and Taran 2016).

**Research question and methodology**

The main question of the study is how the Nomenklatura status explains the longevity of candidates; the respective measurement – belonging to party, state and industrial nomenklatura – are taken from the 1990 and 1994 electoral data.

By this analysis I hope to contribute to the field of political elite’s recruitment studies, and to explore an area for formulating the political elite in post-communist societies. The multiple-time participation in national elections is taken as an indicator of the career politicians emergence.

The Communist Nomenklatura, the nonpartisan “party of power”, and the new leftist parties are explored as three origins of the persistent challengers in the Ukrainian parliament, Verkhovna Rada. The variables of 1994 campaign are believed to be related to the Communist Nomenklatura, since they inherited from it their material resources and organizational skills. On a par with these specific for the post-communist variables, I use in my analysis the variables typical for the recruitment studies in the established democracies: demographics of a candidate, education, occupation, place of registration for elections, and results of elections.

The methodological innovation of this study lies in selecting potential candidates as the sample, rather than using already elected MPs as is commonly done in most analyses. The parameters of background for the moment of the first-time participation and the results of the first ongoing elections are taken as explanatory factors. In terms of the types of capital or assets that attract more active applicants to the political field, it is assumed that successful candidates who won on their first or subsequent attempts, those who won at least once, and those who have never won share one common characteristic: they differ in terms of their age, sex, education, occupation, and affiliation status from citizens who have never attempted to run for office, and, as demonstrated here, from those who have only participated in one election. This difference directs us toward theory of political recruitment in the young democracies.

**Theory**

The literature suggests that electoral rules, party leaders, voters (the demand side), and individual perceptual and attitudinal factors (the supply side) explain who is recruited in politics (Norris 1997). Institutionalized and individual conditions are mediated by the party organization seeking its self-interest and inventing new formal and informal rules—the so-called “habits of a heart” (Galagher and Marsh 1988)—in order to block electoral entry for some aspirant while permitting others (Siavelis and Morgenstern 2008, Kopecky, Mair and Spirova 2012, Botero and Renno 2006). As a result, certain candidates are preferred over others: men over women, younger over older, incumbents over the “new faces”, program-oriented over career oriented, and so on. From the supply side, it is not only individual resources, such as material, social, or psychological, that is important, but also the perception of the existing prejudice and the calculation of chances to win. To
sum up, the “the social bias in Parliament reflects direct and indirect prejudices of party
selectors” (Norris 1997, p. 161). In other words, the prejudice in both sides cause that de-
monic principle of representation fail. In this way, the underrepresentation of women
among the candidates is explained (Fox and Lawless 2010, Fulton 2010, Subonmtsu 2002).

The literature from the established electoral democracies cannot be directly juxtaposed
with the situation in the post-communist countries. Nevertheless, some regularities were
observed in both parts of the democratic world, and congruent with the ongoing prob-
lems in the young democracies. First, Western literature has long discussed the possibili-
ties and pitfalls of majoritarian party contra proportional systems (Fiorina and Noll 1979,
Kitschelt 2000, Lundell 2004, Rahat and Hazan 2001). Thus, majoritarian rule has been
deﬁned as not only a useful tool for establishing a linkage between a party and a voter, but
also for making a way for strategic candidacy and strategic voting and for clientelism and
party-weakening nationalization (Umland, Rybiy and Fedorenko 2016, Bochsler 2010,
Gherghina 2014, Mainwaring and Torcal 2006).

Another popular topic of Western literature is the rationality of the individual choice
of a candidate. This is an important issue because it challenges the two assumptions: that
a candidate always seeks to be elected/re-elected, and that they calculate their chances
correctly. The observations show that both assumptions are wrong, because many candi-
dates continue to try despite poor results, and some candidates withdraw despite the per-
ceived good chances, in particular for the incumbents. The studies showed that apparently
“irrational” decisions of a strong candidate to withdraw or of a weak candidate to partic-
ipate turned to be rational if the degree of competition, the presence of the other strong
candidates, the number of seats opened, the party politics of the available candidates and
many other factors are taken into consideration (Lazarus 2008, Carson and Engstrom

The balance between re-election and replacement is a third issue addressed by the lit-
erature and important for the present analysis. For post-communist societies reelection
is a sharp issue as it could signify both the professionalization and “fossilization” of the
political elite. The first decade of democratic rule brought mixed evidence on whether
re-production processes dominate over replacement, since there any systematic differenc-
es were not found between the old and young democracies (Baylis 1994, Higley, Kullberg
and Pakulski 1996, Wesolowski and Mielczarek 1999, Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000,
Cotta and Best 2000).

Hypotheses

The specific feature of the post-communist countries, right after the demise of the Com-
munism, only one political party, the CPSU, was present at the political scene. Therefore,
party politics has been developing using all the heritage of the Communist rule: patron-
age politics, coalescing in the “party of power” lobbying individual interests, producing
“paper candidates”, to mention just a few (Birch 2000). Communist Nomenklatura, as the
only politically skilled group, was a key creator of such mechanisms.

Nomenklatura in post-communist countries has been defined as a large group of the
Communist party officials and the directors of the state enterprises who composed a sepa-
rate sector of market sector characterized by the capacity to reproduce itself (Voslensky
1984, Slomczynski and Lee 1993). For instance, in Poland’s Solidarity Nomenklatura suc-
cessfully pursued maintaining of high incomes despite of its challenging by civic society (Shabad and Slomczynski 2002). The anticipations that ex-Nomenklatura members will stay at the top of society after renouncing Communism in the 1990s were high in Poland and Hungary (Staniszkis 1991, Hankiss 1990).

In the Ukrainian Parliament and government, the Communist Nomenklatura was quite efficient in keeping their top positions in power. Former Communist Party officials secured for themselves even the top positions of President (Leonid Kravchuk), first parliamentary Speaker (Ivan Pliushch), heads of two governments (Vitalii Masol and Vitold Fokin), and the opposition leaders (Volodymyr Filenko, Volodymyr Lytvyn, Olexandr Moroz). The managers of state enterprises, the “red directors”, were equally or even more so efficient than the Communist Party officials, as were the head of the government Pavlo Lazorenko and 8-time elected Yukhym Zviagilsky. The second President of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, was a “red director”. It is the “red directors” from Kyiv and the East of Ukraine, where large industrial and agricultural enterprises were operating, became later the first oligarchs (Allina-Pissano 2010). The composition of the Communist majority in the first Parliament of Ukraine (1990–1994) has a nearly equal distribution of electoral success of CPSU officials and “red directors”: 25% managers of state enterprises, 22% of the Communist party officials, 13% of Soviet executives, and 21% of agricultural, military, and academic institutions.

At the same time, it must be said in support of replacement hypothesis, that the majority of Communist and Soviet Nomenklatura did not manage to secure their position in Verkhovna Rada (VR). In the 2000s small group of MPs with Nomenklatura background had already vanished (Semenova 2012).

Therefore, the first hypothesis concerns the mere presence of the former Nomenklatura among the candidates as an important indicator of the Nomenklatura’s efforts to stay in power since their political capital was the easiest way to secure high living standards and powerful positions which they had in the past. Thus, Hypothesis 1 posits a greater extent of repeated participation of the former Communist Party officials, Soviet state officials, and managers in the Ukrainian elections than of the rank-and-file communists candidates.

The elections of 1994 occurred in the atmosphere of disappointment with the reforms conducted by rightist liberal wing of the Parliament, who had grievances about the deteriorating living standards and soaring inflation. The privatization program practically failed and the “red directors” remained their status quo and sought for seats very actively. It is believed that many ex-Nomenklatura members among of the candidates in 1994 and that they made up the basis for the new form of clientelism that is the “nonpartisan party of power”.

For Hypothesis 2, I assume that the “nonpartisan party of power” explanation works if candidates who participated through the majoritarian system stay longer in the political race. The alternative way of paving the Nomenklatura’s path into the new democratic politics was joining the newly created left-wing parties, which inherited organizational and material resources and the mobilizational skills of the Communist party (Birch 2000, Ishiyama 2000, Rose 1996). No one in 1994 could have predicted that after the ban of the CPSU in 1991 the leftist forces will consolidate so soon. The hatred for the Communists was significant, and the growing popularity of new lefts was explained by the failure of reforms, aggravated by the economic hardships in 1991–1994. Furthermore, despite the decreasing popularity of the new left after the split of the left-wings in 1998 and their failure at the
Presidential elections of 1999, the aspirations for the seats were high, as the candidates’ data show. Staying in the race so long can be explained by significant “mobilizational” capital of the left-wing. Administrative assets of these parties were believed to be similar to those used by the Communist Party “since both used administrative leverage, telephone systems and other attributes of Soviet Party bureaucracy” (Rozhkova 2005, p.44). Nevertheless, since this professional capital was by far the only political capital in early 1990s, it worked to motivate some applicants to repeatedly attempt election.

Thus, Hypothesis 3 postulates that the leftist parties of the 1994 election tended to send more multiple-time campaigning candidates to elections than any other party or unaffiliated candidates.

The data

The data used for this paper were collected for the research grant, “Who Wins and Who Loses in the Parliamentary Elections? From Formal Theory to Empirical Analysis” (EAST PaC) funded by Poland’s National Science Centre. These data cover electoral campaigns to legislature held in Hungary, Poland, and Ukraine in 1985–2014. The Ukrainian data on eight elections to Ukrainian parliament, Verkhovna Rada, starting from 1990 and ending in 2014, were gathered by the author of this paper from Central Electoral Committee’s websites, with exception of 1990, when the data were retrieved from regional Soviet press. The process of data collecting and cleaning can be found in Pohorila 2016. The result of this process is 35,791 unique records for the candidates to Verkhovna Rada. This paper is focused on the 8,898 candidates who were first-time candidates in the 1990 and 1994 campaigns and continued until 2014. Candidates who started in 1990 are subtracted from those who started in 1994 in order to obtain two “independent samples” of candidates.

Table 1. The candidates and winners, who started in 1990–1994, and the target groups: multiple-time participants and single-time participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1990 Dependent variable</th>
<th>1994 Dependent variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Two times</td>
<td>Three times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2109 STC</td>
<td>391 MTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2109</td>
<td>957 MTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three times</td>
<td>Four times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>142</td>
<td>74 MTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four times</td>
<td>Five times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>40 MTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five times</td>
<td>Six times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>32 MTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six times</td>
<td>Seven times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>20 MTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seven times</td>
<td>Eight times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>8 MTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eight times</td>
<td>Altogether</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>2816</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s original study.

3 The year 2019 is not in the EAST PaC data set and is the reason why it is not included in the analysis.
Table 1 represents the structure of data, where the candidates who took part in the parliamentary election for two and more times are labeled as MTC (multiple-time candidates) and STC (single-time candidates). It can be seen that two-time candidates comprised slightly more than one half of all MTC. The share of the MTC among the candidates fell from 28% in the elections of 1994 to 11% in the elections of 2007. The maximal number of attempts — eight — has been done by eight candidates. Thirty-nine candidates who started in 1990 were still running in the 2014 electoral campaign. Only one candidate won in all 8 campaigns.4

Description of variables and statistical models

Dependent variable

Absolute majority of the literature on recruitment in politics is focused on incumbents-legislators: factors of their success, seeking re-election or reasons of withdrawing from a race. The term “career politician” has been reserved almost exclusively for the MPs. Some studies of candidacy are assembled in the volume “Passages to Power”, edited by Pippa Norris (1997). The authors from different Western societies consider the effects the political system has on candidacy, the candidates’ motivation, party politics toward candidates’ selection, the role of professional and political experience for success, and electoral strategies such as “technical candidacy”. None of these studies of candidates defined multiple time candidates or the number of attempts of a single candidate as a dependent variable. In some studies of post-communism elections, the number of parties that stood for election has been a dependent variable (Bochsler 2010, Gherghina 2014). In rational choice studies the number of candidates in constituency was frequently a dependent variable. However, the factor of winning has been a main explanatory variable. Therefore, candidacy was not considered as an object of a study (Lazarus 2008, Osborne and Slivinski 1996). In one East European analysis the number of attempts to run a race has been used as an explanatory variable of electoral success, not as a phenomenon for its own sake (Shabad and Slomczynski 2002). That is why the results of the previous and present studies are not comparable.

In the present study the dependent variable is a dummy variable, where candidates who took part in the parliamentary election at least twice are coded as “1” and labeled as MTC. STCs are coded as “0”. Bivariate regression has been used for the analysis. Hypotheses are tested separately for those candidates whose first elections were held in 1990 (Models I-II in the Table 2) and 1994 (Models III-V in the Table 3). These two subsamples do not intersect, so that the MTCs who started in 1990 are subtracted from the 1994 sample.

The reasons for considering the years of 19905 and 1994 as observation units are as follows. First, most of the long-players are 1990–1994-starters. Having started observation from the latter years, we would mostly have obtained the sample of two-time runners, which is not exactly the MTC sample. Furthermore, if to start from 2002 and later years,

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4 This candidate’s name is Yukhym Zviagil's'ky. Upon commencing his first term he was 67 years old, and upon commencing his last he was 81 years old.

5 The elections of 1990 were democratic, although in a limited sense. The presence of at least two rivals had been ensured at every district. Despite the one-party system, the voters were well aware who of the Communists-candidates were associated with oppositional Rukh movement and the Democratic bloc; and who belonged to “stone-made” Nomenklatura.
the STC will be younger, still running, and possibly willing to try again, while STCs from 1990–1994 are most probably at the end of their active political life in 2010s, and there is less reason to compare them with the younger STCs.

The reason for not including the 1998 election into the analysis is that occupation, the key explanatory variable in my analysis, could be coded only until the 1998 campaign. After 1994, following the “oligarchization” process, the candidates associated with a business started to hide their background, not pointing the occupation that brings profits, but using very general formulations, or reporting only secondary, not business-related job. As a result, the coding of occupations in 1998 and later years are much less reliable than those of 1990 and 1994, and neither Nomenklatura, nor party of power hypothesis can be tested.

Independent variables

Independent variables are coded for the year in which the candidate’s career began. The list of independent variables differs slightly in 1990 and 1994 depending on data availability and specific hypotheses.

The independent variables are grouped in a way to start with testing Nomenklatura-related hypotheses and to continue with variables typical for the classical studies of political elite recruitment: demographics, education, place of living, and the results of election.

1. Nomenklatura variables. In the 1990 campaign’s data there were two Nomenklatura-related variables: the “officials” and the “managers”. The “officials” included Communist Party and Soviet state functionaries of all levels, state administration, their deputies, local-level party secretaries, and trade union leaders. In 1994, when the CPSU no longer existed, the new-born parties’ leaders had been included in the “officials” group, while this group was no longer defined as “Nomenklatura”. As “managers” in 1990 and 1994 I coded top managers of Soviet enterprises (directors), managers of departments, deputy managers, and industrial and non-industrial enterprises. As no privatization program or any reorganization reform were conducted in 1990–1993, this category is almost the same in 1990 and 1994, and can be conditionally labeled as “red directors”.

2. “Nonpartisan party of power”. For the 1994 party membership was coded as “1” for unaffiliated and “0” for the party members of the newly created parties.

3. Leftist party individual membership is coded as belonging to one of the left-wing parties: Communist Party of Ukraine, the Socialist Party, Progressive Socialist, and the Rural Party.

4. Age is categorized based on the initial ballot year of 1990 or 1994 and divided into three groups: the youngest ranging from 18 to 35, those aged 36 to 55, which constitute the majority, and those above 55 years of age. In the regression models run for the 1990 elections, the group of those older than 55 was included in the list of dependent variables, while the youngest candidates were kept as a referent group, because it was important to test the Communist elite reproduction hypothesis. In 1994, when Nomenklatura no longer existed, it became more important to test the replacement hypothesis. Therefore, candidates older than 55 were taken as a referent group.
Education has been coded as dummy variable: “1” stands for university level, “0” – for all other levels. For 1990 the data on education were not available.

Models for 1990 and 1994 include the variables “Western region”, “Eastern region”, and “Kyiv”, while the “Center” is a referent group. These variables represent the regions—or oblasts—where a candidate was registered for elections. More active participation of officials and managers from the Eastern part can be proof of the “party of power” thesis (Sadowski and Pohorila 2018, Birch 1997). Kyiv-originated candidates could represent the specific “capital’s city capital”, which means high concentration of human and professional experience of the candidates from Kyiv (Rozhkova 2005).

5. The victory in the first elections taken are coded as “1/0”. The “small votes” were defined as lowest quintile of the votes obtained in the first round of elections. The number of small votes’ candidates in 1990 was 3,000. In 1994 it was 1,677. The consideration of this variable is purported to test whether any specific category – young candidates, women, aged candidates – are discouraged by poor results more than the others.

Analysis of multiple time participation

The results of binary logistic regression for the 1990 at the Table 2 indicates that the prevalence of the Communist party and state Nomenklatura among the MTC is not statistically significant; while the odds of the rank-and-file CPSU member being found among the MTC is 39% less than that of for the independent candidates.

However, the Nomenklatura hypothesis can be supported if to take into account the fact that those of them who lost the 1990 elections appeared in the consequent elections more often than the incumbents from Nomenklatura origin and non-Nomenklatura candidates and as the value of the interaction term in the Model II (Table 2) indicates. Although being an incumbent increases a candidate’s likelihood of seeking re-election by 6.6 times, it is worth noting that winners who held official or managerial positions were less likely to seek re-election compared to other winners. The explanation of the withdrawal from a race could be the elderly age of the incumbents, which is supported by another statistically significant interaction term between the age and the status of official in Model II, Table 2. The odds that a former official older than 55 appear in electoral lists again is 62% lower than for the other age and professional categories.

The Model III, (Table 3) shows that the probability to find an unaffiliated candidate among the MTC are twice less than that for the party members (Table 3). Those officials who have party affiliation are in particular more frequent among the MTC, Model V, (Table 3). However, unaffiliated managers appeared to be 1.5 times more prone to seek a political career than all the rest of categories. That leaves a place for the “nonpartisan party of power” hypothesis to be applied for the “red directors” only. For the partisans—party officials and state administration – party affiliation seems to be a path to politics.

6 Saying this one has to remember that the former CPSU members who stood for the 1994–2014 elections have outnumbered, those who started as independents in 1990, 3–7 times, depending on a campaign (Table 1A).
Table 2. Demographic and biographic characteristics of multiple-time candidates, who started in 1990. Binary logistic regression, \( \exp (B) \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model I N=2816</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model II N=2816</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exp(B)</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
<td>Exp(B)</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine specific variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPSU members</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist party and state officials</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directors</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officials x won elections 1990</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directors x won elections 1990</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officials who were 56 and older in 1990</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyiv</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universal variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Won elections at 1-st attempt</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td>6.57</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small votes at 1-st attempt</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of start 36–55</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of start 56+</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.422</td>
<td>0.422</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke R²</td>
<td>0.169</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.177</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of correctly predicted cases</td>
<td>76.5%</td>
<td>76.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ** Significant at the level \( p< 0.01 \); * Significant at the level \( 0.05>p>0.01 \).

Source: Author’s original study.
Table 3. Demographic and biographic characteristics of multiple-time candidates, who started in 1994. Binary logistic regression, \( \exp (B) \)^7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1994</th>
<th>Model III</th>
<th>Model IV</th>
<th>Model V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=6082</td>
<td>N=6082</td>
<td>N=6082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \exp (B) )</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
<td>( \exp (B) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>1.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of start 18–35</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>2.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of start 36–55</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University education</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>1.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No party affiliation</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-wing parties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party and state officials</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directors and managers</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyiv</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Won elections at 1-st attempt</td>
<td>10.89</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>10.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small votes at 1-st attempt</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officials x partisans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directors x not affiliated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small votes X who were 35 and younger in 1990</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.182</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke R²</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of correctly predicted cases</td>
<td>75.4%</td>
<td>75.4%</td>
<td>75.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ** Significant at the level \( p < 0.01 \); * Significant at the level \( 0.05 > p > 0.01 \).

Source: Author’s original study.

7 Models III and IV were run to include separately, in order to make visible the effects of unaffiliated status and of membership in the left-wing party members. Including these two variables in one equation would have caused multicollinearity, since the Candall correlation between the two is 0.5.
The negative effect of the unaffiliated status has on repeated challenges the office may be taken as a proof that party politics, however premature the political parties might be, was slowly institutionalizing. The Model IV (Table 3) indicates that the institutionalization process was tangible in the case of the left-wing parties. The odds that their candidates will get into MTC is 1.5 times higher for than that of for centrists, rightists, and unaffiliated.

As to the classical recruitment statistical models, the probability to find a male among the MTC was higher than that for females. For females no statistically significant coefficient for interaction term with the small votes was observed. Therefore, one can, at least, say that the perceptual factor is not salient in this case. The observation of the poor result does not discourage female more than male candidates.

University education increased the chances of the 1994 candidates to be found among the MTS, so does the younger age for both 1990 and 1994 starters.

In 1990 and 1994 elections, the Western, not the expected Eastern, region delegated more long-standing candidates than Center (except for Kyiv) and the East. No effect for the “red directors” from the Eastern region has been observed, so the theory of regional basis of most active Nomenklatura members has not been confirmed (not shown in the Table). One has to remember that in 1994 many of the Eastern Ukrainian “red directors” had relocated to Kyiv. It is therefore possible that a significant effect for Kyiv candidates is partially explained by their presence.

The fact of winning the elections from the first trial is the most powerful predictor of belonging to the MTC. A small number of votes discourages the participants. Thus, the odds to find lowest quintile candidates 1990 and 1994 among the MTC of 2002–2014 are lower than for those who have more votes, by 49% and 66%, respectively. A somewhat stronger discouraging effect of the “small votes” was observed only for the young candidates from 1994. Thus, although the odds for the young candidates to be found among the MTC in 1994 was higher than for the other groups, it was true only for those young who obtained more satisfying results.

Conclusions and discussion
This paper explores the possibility to apply the hypothesis on Nomenklatura’s ways to pave a path to political power in the independent Ukraine. The study of multiple-time candidates enables one to address the professional background, demographics, and political outcome of the candidates who are most attracted to political activity. The attractiveness is measured by the tendency to participate in the elections to Parliament despite the results of the first attempt. The benefit of using participation as a behavioral variable in the analysis is in its high reliability when comparing to the survey data, while the latter in the case of candidates are most frequently absent.

The analysis shows three possibilities how the Communist Nomenklatura secured its presence in the candidacy. Among the longstanding candidates from the 1990 election, the direct presence of officials and managers was observed even despite the withdrawal of its older members and some incumbents from subsequent elections.

In 1994, on par with persistency of the candidates affiliated with the newly born parties, the unaffiliated managers were found more frequently among the multiple times’ candidates. This finding supports the hypothesis about specific electoral strategy that has been
used by the part of the candidates of presumably Nomenklatura origins: not to join any parties, lobbying their interests, or not following programmatic ideology. This finding gave ground for the “nonpartisan party of power” evolution.

Another explanation of staying longer in a political race was the joining of left-wing political parties. The tendency of the leftist parties to send more candidates who continued their attempts throughout the years may be interpreted as a result of intensive mobilizational capacity and party leadership skills inherited from the CPSU.

Using the statistical instead of qualitative career studies induces several limitations. First, multiple-time candidacy as a dependent variable addresses a very small pool of candidates, since Parliamentary elections are taken only once every four years. Therefore, in order to have the MTC group large enough for statistical analysis, we must start observations from the earliest possible term, which is 1990. Replication of the analysis on the later years will cause a situation when a researcher will get a sample of only two-time challengers and will compare it to the sample of the STC who are young enough to undertake more attempts in a future, and to become an MTC. That is why extending the analysis to the candidates who began in 1998 and 2002 will change the basis for comparison of the MTC and STC, and hardly be compared in the 1990 and 1994 starters. Therefore, this extension demands a separate analysis.

Second limitation is connected to the definition of Nomenklatura. By my definition, Nomenklatura includes functionaries of all levels: state administration, officials and their deputies, local-level party secretaries, and trade union leaders. However, the fact of huge differences between central party authorities and local party officials, as well as between the directors of a large-scale plant and local school, is obvious. More precise operationalization would demand conducting an additional study on the background of several thousand candidates for many of whom there is no information in machine-readable form. Even if such work had been done, the target group of the MTC of the top Nomenklatura will be so small that only qualitative career study would be applicable. Thus, both limitations are conditioned by the fact that political elite, as any elite, is small.

The third limitation is connected with the changing electoral rules in Ukraine. Since 1997 the electoral system in Ukraine has changed three times: first from a majoritarian to the mixed system, then in 2006 to proportional, and in 2012 back to mixed system. These changes mean also changes in the structure of opportunities for the candidates, incentives for the winners, and practices of adjustment to the new rules. The study of the effect of these changes on multiple-time participation implies case-by-case study of all candidates from elections to elections that is not practically feasible. Even if such a study would be taken, motives would not have been willingly uncovered by the participants. This problem is especially difficult in the case of “paper candidates”, the candidates invited by the parties for strategic goals, not for winning the elections. Despite the above-mentioned limitations, it would be wise and challenging to determine which types of capital or assets are more likely to attract enduring candidates.
References


**Appendix**

*Table 1A*. Number of the ex-Communists, who started in 1990 and became candidates in subsequent elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPSU-90 members</td>
<td>2265</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No CPSU (1990)</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2588</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s original study.